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THE REGULATION OF GREEN ADVERTISING: 
THE STATE, THE MARKET 
AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL GOOD* 
DAVID S. COHENt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At one time, popular visions of political and economic life were simple. 
There was a myth that governments delivered public goods-national 
defence, criminal and civil justice, police protection, water and sewage 
infiastruture, education, and social welfare services, among others- 
and the formal instrument employed by governments to do this was 
"la\vn--direct commands of the state backed by its sanctions. There 
was, however, a second myth, that the private sector was delivering 
private goods-automobiles, consumer durables, chemicals, food prod- 
ucts, capital equipment, among others. The instrument employed by 
the private sector to deliver these goods was the market and its aggregate 
of capital managed by corporate managers. Life was good, or, at least, it 
was simple.' 
About IOO years or so ago, depending on where one looks and how 
one wants to differentiate the private sphere from the public, it can be 
said that governments in Canada began delivering private goods as 
* I would like to thank Brian Cheffins, Murray Rankin and Catherine Davergne for their 
comments on earlier dmfcs. As well, I would like to thank Paul Fairweather and Alison Taylor for 
their invaluable assistance in writing this paper. Without their ener and stimulating critique 
the pa er would not have been written. In particular, I would like to Kk both of them for their 
contri g ution to the discussion o f  preference shaping and propaganda" in Part 6 of this paper. It 
is my sincere hope that they will pursue the ideas there expressed. Of course, any errors are my 
responsibility. 
t Professor David Cohen, Facul of Law, University of British Columbia. The author is a r member of the Advisory Board o the Federal Environmental Choice Program which is discussed 
in this aper. All ofthe views expressed in the paper are of the author only, and do not represent 
the pobcies of the Environmental Choice Program. 
O David Cohen, 1991 
1 Myths, while necessary, often obscure more than enlighten. Regulatory history demonstrates 
that government has involved itself in the regulation of the marketplace and the "private" 
sector, particularly as an arbitrator ofconflicting economic interests since Confederation (see C. 
Brown-John, G d i a n  Replatog Agencis- (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1981) at 12). That is, what 
we d l  private and public is often nothing more than a reflection of what we are comfortable 
with at any point in history; or what we believe ought to be the difference between our 
individual autonomy and our community identity. 
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well-rail transportation2, post-secondary education3, broadcast ser- 
vices: health care,5 among others. This has continued, more or less 
without interruption, through to the present day: Air Canada was 
established in 1937; the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation in 
1946; Petro-Canada in 1974: These are notable examples among the 
259 wholly government-owned or effectively government-controlled 
enterprises all of which, in their turn, owned or controlled 268 subsid- 
iaries in the mid-1980s.~ Governments also began to use a much more 
2 In fact, the first modern American regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
was established in 1887 specifically to oversee and regulate the burgeoning system of ublic and 
private railroads in that country (see S. Breyer, Regukztion and In Rrform (~ambrifge, Mass.: 
H m d  University Press, 1982) at I). The Canadian equivalent, the Board of Railway Commis- 
sioners (which is similarly seen as the first modern regulatory agency in this count ), was not X created until 1903. Previous to that time, the regulation of Canadian railroads was andled by 
the Railway Committee of the Privy Council (see Economic Council of Canada, The Emergence 
of the Regukztory State in Can&, 1867 - 1939 (C. Baggaley) (1981) at 77-79). 
Between 1896 and 1913, the Canadian overnment's current expendimres quadrupled and a developmental pro'ects (railroads and ot er public and commercial avenues of trans ort) 
for railways, canals, harbours and river improvements (ibid at 43). 
S accounted for over half the increase. ~ l m o s t  all the federal debt incurred during the perio was 
3 Confederation and the 'oining of Canada by the western provinces in 1867 resulted in the 
establishment of a num b er of n0.n-denominational state-run institutions of higher learnin . P Even rior to that time, the universities in Eastern Canada, most ofwhich were independent y 
foungd with religious &liations, were receiving some public monies (see Joseph Katz, Society, 
Schools and Progress in Canah (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1969)). 
4 Governments have been involved with the regulation of the airwaves since the first successful 
'wireless' broadcasts in the final decade ofthe nineteenth century. Publicly-owned broadcasting 
in Canada was begun by the government of Manitoba in 1923 upon the demise of the only two 
radio stations in the Province, both of which had been private enterprises. The Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation came into being on z November 1936 with the passing of the 
BroadcastingAct (S.C. 1936, c. 24). This formalized the rather loosely formed nenvork of radio 
broadcasting extant to that time (see Frank Foster, Broadrating Policy Development (Ot t aw 
Franfost Communications Ltd., 1982)). 
5 The first public health agencies in'Canada came into bein in the first half of the nineteenth 
century to cope with devastating epidemics of communica i le diseases, such as the outbreak of 
cholera in 1932 which occurred with the arrival of large numbers of Irish immigrants. As the 
existing health services were unable to address the large numbers ofsickand dying, the epidemic 
spread through the colonies. In 1832-33, the legislatures of Lower Canada, Nova Scoria, New 
, 
Brunswick, Upper Canada, and Newfoundland assed legislation establishing local boards of 
health to control the outbreak. A central board oPhealth was established in 1849 and more local 
boards were formed through the yean leading up to Confederation in 1867. Governments in 
Canada have continued to the resent day to rovide services such as communicable disease 
control, food and drug controfI maternal anBchild health care, dental health care, health 
education services, nutrition services, public health laboratories, and research and statistics. 
Public hospitals and, as is well known, programs of publicly subsidized medical insurance have 
been provided (see Canada, Royal Commission on Health Services, Report (chair: Justice 
Emmett Hall) ( 1964)). 
6 Ownership was also used to restructure or revitalize key industries: the Canadian National 
Railway in 1919; the Cape Breton Development Co oration in 1967; de HaviUand in 1974; 
Canadair in 1976; and Fishery Products ~nternationrand ~ a d o n a l  Sea Products in the early 
1983s (see K. Stein, "Canada's Programme for Privatization" in M. Walker, ed., Privatization: 
Tactia and Techniques (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1987) at 70). 
7 Allan Tupper and G .  Bruce Doern, "Canadian Public Enterprise and Privatization" in k 
Tupper and G. Bruce Doern, eds., Public Co~oratiom andPublic Policy in Canah (Montreal: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981) at 7. The authors go on to state that "[tlhe 259 
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complicated and sophisticated range of regulatory instruments to de- 
liver this expanding set of public benefits.' In particular, governments 
started to use markets and independent corporate structures to produce 
and allocate at least some of these goods and services? While all of this 
was going on, industry continued to deliver their private goods, compet- 
ing head-on with government enterprise in some cases, in others, 
enjoying the comparative simplicity of competing only with other 
private-sector actors. 
Recently, an increasingly cynical and disappointed public has started 
to demand reconsideration of the relative roles of public managers and 
private capital. Demands have been made that governments stop trying 
to pretend that they can be capitalists. The general inability of govern- 
ments to operate effectively, the absence of market discipline to con- 
strain and direct public managers, the difficulty in predicting public 
demand without markets, the failure of substantive equality ideology to 
support non-market intervention, and the fiscal constraints of deficit 
financing all have led to neo-conservative strategies. The message, in its 
most extreme form, is simple: governments should leave private-sector 
activities to the private sector and restrict themselves to producing and 
delivering only those goods that the market cannot adequately create 
parent firms accounted for 26' of the net &xed assets ofall Canadian corporations but less than 
5% of total employment in the economy. They account for over 35% of total government . 
employment but only about 1696 of total public sector employment (which includes the 
education and hospital sectors)." 
8 Governments have a great variety of sanctions, incentives and other tools at their disposal 
designed to help achieve their goals. These include the authoricy to spend money; a plication of 
threats of physical force (police and prison); initiation of litigation; creation o / regulations; 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; criminal sanctions; licensing authoricy which typically 
includes the authoricy to suspend or revoke the licence; compensation awards (workers' 
compensation boards, for example); and powers ofinvestigation and disclosure (see Stephen G. 
Breyer and Richard B. S t e m ,  Adminimative Law and Reguhtov Policy, (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1985) ar 3-6). 
Stein sutes in M. Walker, supra, note 6 at 72 that 
Government has at its disposal a number of instruments to implement public policy. Ir can 
s end, it can tax, it can legislate and regulate, and it can own. AU of these instruments have 
tpeir relative strengths and weaknesses. All have to be carefully assessed and reassessed in 
terms of their contribution to national objectives. 
' Breyer and Stewart discuss direct government provisions ofgoods and services as an administra- 
tive function ofmodern governmenr. Traditional e.xamples include the mainrenance of the post 
office; the construction ~fpublicworks uch as highwajrs, dams and navigation improvem;nts; 
the provision ofpolice, fire and other protectiveservices; and funding ofpublic education. More 
recent additions include mass transit, communications satellite systems, government research 
and development programs, public hospitals and ublic housing. There are also a number of 
custodial functions carried out by government inc ! uding the maintenance and administration 
of prisons and mental hospitals. In order to carry out these various responsibilities, government 
must hire personnel, acquire goods and services, and manage government-owned land and 
other resources. These activities are traditionally referred to as activities (analo- 
ous to the activities of private proprietors) as contrasted with taxation, and other 
knctions carried on esclusively or primarily by government 
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and distribute, such as a standing military, a criminal justice system and 
SO on. 
This brings us to what may be the most recent development in the 
transformation of regulatory policy-the abdication by the govern- 
ment of what have been viewed traditionally as its appropriate respon- 
sibilities of delivering public goods and services. Until recently, 
privitization has involved government's returning of responsibility for 
delivering private goods to the private sector. This represents a much 
more dramatic stage of development. Within government, neo- 
conservatives have argued that if government has done such a poor job 
of delivering private goods, perhaps they have done an equally poor job 
of delivering public goods. Simultaneously, private enterprise has seen 
the opportunity to profit from government divestiture. Why should 
penal institutions be public? Why should health care hcilities be public? 
Why should water and sewage facilities be public? And, most important 
from the perspective of environmentalists, why should environmental 
regulation and the delivery of environmental benefits be public? 
In this paper I explore this most recent development in regulatory 
policy and, in particular, the role government plays when it chooses to 
use private markets (consumer, institutional and corporate) as regula- 
tory instruments to produce and allocate environmental benefits. The 
privatization of environmental regulation by employing markets to 
deliver environmental benefits does not involve the implementation of 
public policy through executive or legislative action. Rather, it is 
achieved through a public choice to privatize the delivery of environ- 
mental regulation by permitting or encouraging decentralized economic 
power to respond to consumer demands for environmental quality." 
' 0  Privatization of environmental regulation reflects and is the product of several inter-connected 
ideas which have come together as we end the twentieth cenrury. First, it reflects one 
a plication of the idea popularized by the Bmndtland Commission - that economic 
lcisions must integrate environmental considerations. The conce t of "sustainable develop- 
ment" can be used to demand that environmental policy must re f' ect economic imperatives. 
This interpretation is attractive ro those who advocate privatization initiatives which can be 
justified on the ground that environmental policy, through its allocation to the private sector, 
should be integrated with economic policy. 
Second, privatization addresses the intractable roblem Faced b public choice theorists - 
that of identifying and measuring demand for pu%lic goods whiL  are not delivered through 
market mechanisms. Using markets to deliver environmental quality assumes that there is a 
substantial number of individuals who are demanding irn rovements in their local and global 
environments, and who win .express that demand in 4 eir economic decisions. The m t  
untapped demand for environmental benefits can be harnessed to the dynamically efficient 
and creative engine of industry for the benefit of us all. Capital markets, industrial,commodity, 
inventory and capital equipment markets, consumer markets and labour markets can all be 
exploited to deliver the environmental goods, it is said. 
Third, privatization means that the production of environmental policy is measured in 
market transactions - investment in waste management firms, increased emplo ment and 
thus aggregate income in theenvironmentalsector, investment in research and deve r opment to 
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In Part I of this paper I describe the dramatic transformation during 
the past decade in our thinking about the relative place of central 
bureaucracies and governments in environmental regulation, and in our 
selecting of one or the other to deliver environmental- benefits de- 
manded by citizens as consumers." But that metamorphosis has had as a 
catalyst another paradigmatic shift-to the recognition that our tradi- 
tional conception ofwhat we mean by the environment and its relation- 
ship to the market is no longer effective in developing contemporary 
public and private environmental policies. 
Until recently, popular conceptions of the environment have been 
c c  
non-economic," which is to say that environmental issues have been 
framed as the preservation of rivers, clean ground-water for human 
consumption, pristine views, peaceful parklands and so on. Similarly, 
the economy has been conceived of in "non-environmental" terms; that 
is, economic issues have been framed in terms of employment and 
productivity levels, internal rates ofreturn, costs of capital, foreign trade 
surpluses, GNP, exchange transaction aggregates and others. 
The recent transformation of regulatory theory demonstrates an 
integrated image of the economy and the environment. It is not, 
however, the simplistic linking of one with the other that characterizes 
many discussions of sustainable development. Integration of the econ- 
omy with the environment means that we must come to understand 
these nvo things as one and the same. 
develoo orodum and eauioment to address environmental concerns. ourchases of eauioment 
designid to reduce envi;oimend impacts in manufacturing, and in=;eased sales of ;odds and 
services which generate environmental benefits. Thus privatization of environmental policy 
means increased employment in the private sector, initeases in gross national produs, anil 
associated measures of economic activity. By contrast, v i d y  all other "public' instruments 
to which we might resort in order to generate these environmental goods means increased 
usation. 
Fourth, privatization means that the delivery of the environmental goods is performed by 
corporations whose performance is measured by output in market transactions. It means that 
we are using mechanisms which incorporate market discipline to control employment and 
managerial decision-making, thus taking advantage of the alleged internal efficacy of private 
bureaucratic organization. Delivering environmental quality through markets means we 
triggercompeti<on am~n~decentraliiidactors to maximizephtegai~ through theselection 
of products by consumer and cornorate ourchasers. The comoetition is enhanced throueh the 
ability of corI;orate actors to take Hdvanke of regional differekes in demand for envirohen- 
taI yality, and by the ability ofcorporations not only to deliver a fixed order of environmental 
qu ity efficiently, bur also to act dynamically in developing new methods to address environ- 
mental concerns. 
Finally, the decision to use markets as a delivery mechanism, while it usually results in 
inegalitarian discrimination based on wealth, does not do so in the case of purchase decisions 
which are intended to benefit the community at large. The beneficiaries of private market 
transactions motivated by environmental concerns are not only the primary purchasers, but 
more important, are the unknowable members of the community-who benefit regardless of 
assets or income. 
1' As I point out later, one can argue that the behaviour, preferences and values of consumers 
acting in markets is not at aII like the behaviour, preferences and values of those same citizens 
acting as voters and member of the body politic. See in& note 39. 
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One can depict the world in two ways: either as a static image 
representing the current state of the world or as a dynamic image 
representing the world in transformation. When one thinks of the 
environment, it is as a static image of the collection of its biophysical 
resources, comprising human skills and training, both intellectual and 
manual; diverse natural resources, including soil, air, water, forest, 
mineral, biological; industrial outputs and processes, and a host of 
others, some valued in their own right, some valued by reason of their 
utility to humankind. When one thinks of the economy, however, it is 
as a dynamic image of its institutions, comprising various markets, 
capital, product, and service; market players, corporate and personal; 
bureaucracies, centrally or decentrally directed; and  other^,'^ through all 
of which the same collection of biophysical reseources is preserved, 
transformed, combined, processed, allocated and then distributed to 
corporate entities and human beings.13 
The decision to privatize environmental regulation, thereby using the 
market to deliver environmental benefits, recognizes that through all of 
our personal, professional and corporate decisions we are continuously 
creating and transforming the environment. The use of markets to 
deliver environmental benefits recognizes that consumers are environ- 
mental planners.14 
At one level, it does not matter whether we can bring ourselves to 
admit the duality of our identities; the failure of our individual and 
collective imagination is irrelevant. In purchasing consumer goods for 
personal use, capital equipment and supplies for industrial use; in 
- making choices about inventory sources; and in choosing among alter- 
native sources of inputs for manufacturing processes, purchasers are 
making decisions that, individually and collectively, shape and deter- 
12 One of my collegues who read this paper pointed out, quite correctly, that this is only a partial 
view of the economv and environment. The transformatow apparatus re~resented bv markets 
and command ecoiomies are only a subset of a range df z u r a l  tran~format~r~'~rocesses 
includin geological, evolutionary, and other physical and biological processes which are 
constantb creating new environments. 
13 It has been amistake toview the environment and the economy as two se arate entities whether 
one says they are related or unrelated to one another. The economy and 2 e environment are not 
nvo different things "linked" in the sense that we ought to think of one when we think of the 
other. Rather, the econom and the environment are one "thin seen throu h two different is i lenses. Thar being so. imprementin environmental olicy sho d not mean t inking that we 
must trade one off against the oker. Thus the c!allenge which confronts us is not the 
environment or the economy; it is how we can come to think about the economy and 
environment as one. 
14 The assumption that an individual can make beneficial environmental choices at the same time 
as she is acting as a consumer should raise a number of concerns. I will later discuss at  some 
length the centralproblemsassociatedwith this ideaand the difficulties ofattempting to assume 
a dual role of this nature. 
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mine the environment.'' That being so, the choice we fice is either to 
remain blind to the environmental impact of our market decisions or to 
begin to develop processes and systems to inform ourselves of the extent 
and nature of that impact, thereby permitting us to make adjustments 
consistent with broader societal goals. Consumers can be good environ- 
mental planners or poor environmental planners. The fact that such 
planning is unpremeditated is irrelevent in considering its environmen- 
tal consequences. 
In Part 111, I offer a number of reasons why we ought to be cautious 
before we completely trust markets to act as our most appropriate 
regulatory instruments for generating environmental benefits. In partic- 
ular, I argue that markets that allocate and distribute environmental 
quality will likely be dysfunctional, both because of the self-interested 
behaviour of producers and because of the incapacity for self-correction 
of the market due to informational assymetries and the inability of 
purchasers to monitor environmental claims. In Part IV, I explain, by 
way of numerous examples of green advertising from the past three 
years, how environmental marketing and advertising can be misleading. 
I argue in Part V that the state must continue to be implicated in 
formulating responses to the dysfunctional character of markets that 
hampers their ability to address issues of environmental quality." In 
particular, I argue that if markets are employed to deliver environmental 
benefits, we will certainly continue to require government involvement 
in regulating misleading advertising, and perhaps in developing more 
creative and effective solutions to the market dysfunction that may 
characterize this form of environmental regulation. But ultimately, 
reliance on consumer goods markets to generate environmental benefits 
means that we must understand the ways in which we come to think 
about the environment. 
In Part VI, I suggest that the success of this privitization initiative will 
depend, in the end, on individual and collective preferences as they are 
manifest in markets. If we are going to use real markets to generate 
environmental benefits, we will have to come to terms with our concerns 
as citizens and our responsibilities as inhabitants of the world we share. 
We cannot blind ourselves to the reality that the ways we think about 
global warming, deforestation, incineration at sea, and other ecological 
ills is a product of a complicated environmental acculturation process 
15 Again, the language we use to express these ideas is critical. What one should be saying is that 
the decisions of purchasers are the environment! 
16 Most abstractly, the state permits this form of regulation rather than deploying its available 
resources in alternative regulatory endeavours. As well, the market and its associated compo- 
nents - contracts, trademark protection and the like, can only o erate if the state, through the 
legal system, recognizes and protects contract expecrations an 1 property rights. 
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that we must be able to describe, evaluate and ultimately shape ifwe are 
to survive. 
11. T H E  TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONI7 
For the most part, the regulation of industrial and manufacturing 
activities that have long- or short-term negative impacts on the natural 
environment has been premised on a "command-and-control" model, 
that is, governmental sanctions as prescribed for environmentally harm- 
ful behaviour. In the classic sense, command and control means the 
establishment of a standard or a rule along with a corresponding 
stipulation of a penalty for violation.'* The penalty may be of a quasi- 
criminal nature, whereby the offender is made subject to the criminal 
justice system,I9 or it may involve ticketing2' administrative penalties,'' 
suspension or cancellation of injunctions or restraining or- 
ders" or some combination thereof. 
17 See M. Rankin, "Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Some Canadian Ap- 
proaches" (1990) 1 Can. J. of Env. and Practice. I am grateful to Professor Rankin for much of 
the derail in the following discussion. 
The choice of instrument and the setting of thestandards or regulations has not been an "arms- 
length" process: 
Traditionally, principles for environmental rotection have been arrived at largely through a 
process of negotiation bemeen the r e d t o r s  and the regulated industry. Under the 
Government Organization Act, 1970 (RS.C. 1970-71. c. 42 as amended by the Government 
Oqanization Act, 1979, R.S.C. 1978-79, c. 13) the federal Minister of the Environment was 
empowered to initiate and recommend programs to promote the establishment or adoption 
of obiectives or standards relating to environmental qualin, or pollution control. The 
prim&yagency responsible for this-mandate has been th/~nv&onm;ntal Protection Service 
(EPS) of the Department of the Environment. 
Constance D. Hunt, H. Ian Roundthwaite, and J. Owen Saunders, "Environment Protection 
and Resource Development: Legislation, Policy and Institutions" in B. Sadler, ed., Environ- 
mental Protection and Resource Development: Convergence for Today (Calgary: University of 
Cdgary Press, 1985) at 12. 
19 This generally tends to result in the imposition of fines, although a variety ofsentencing options 
are open upon the entering of a conviction. For example, propercy may be forfeited; licences, 
permits and other privileges may be suspended or revoked; probation orders may be issued; 
restitution and compensation may be ordered; or imprisonment may result. See M. Rankin, 
supra, note 17. 
20 Various statutes such as the Fisheries Act, (RS.B.C. 1979, c. 137), the Pesticide Control Act, 
(RS.B.C. 1979, c. 324, the Wate Management Act, (S.B.C. 1982, c. 41), and the WfdIife Act, 
(S.B.C. 1982, c. 57), call for fines in the order of $roo to $200 for stipulated offenses. Ibid 
21 Often called civil penalties, these may be defined as administratively-imposed civil money 
penalties that are authorized under a statute. An example of this type of penalty can be found in 
the Worken'Compemation Act, (RS.B.C. 1979. c. 437, s. 75) where an assessment may be made 
against an employer who allows or creates dangerous working conditions. Ibid 
22 This option is provided, for example, in s. 20 of the WaterAct, (RS.B.C. 1979, c. 429). and in 
s. 23 of the Wate Management Act. 
This remedy enables the Minister to take action in the Supreme Court of a province to prevent 
the offender from carrying on activities contrary to statureor the common law. For example, see 
s. 24 of the Wate Manaaement Act, which empowers the Minister to seek a restraining order in 
- 
respect of certain activzies involving special-wastes. Ibid 
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Although some commentators have defended the status quo of com- 
mand and there is an increasingly vocal and widespread call 
for the implementation of new regulatory strategies based on economic 
incentives and on greater utilization of the marketplace. Commentators 
have noted a number of drawbacks to a command-and-control model:25 
the high abatement costs that become incentives to continue polluting 
rather than to begin complying with regulations; the lack of incentives 
to continue reducing pollution after specific emission standards are met; 
the lack of incentives to ensure that industrial or municipal treatment 
facilities are operated efficiently and effectively; enforcement delays, 
where recalcitrant polluters defer compliance indefinitely through the 
use of built-in appeal mechanisms. As well, the injunctions and other 
relief granted are not easily adjusted to suit either the severity of the 
violation or temporary economic conditions, and the fines that are 
levied tend to be counter-productive to the goal of environmental 
pr~tection.~' 
One can identify a number of alternatives to the traditional regula- 
tory policies, either in place or recommended, in much of North 
America. These include surety bonds?' emission and effluent charges?' 
transferrable emission delay penalties and financial incentive 
2.' A particularly cogent defence of the current model of regulatory practice can be found in 
H. Latin, "Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and 
'Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Reforms," (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267. The author cites decreased 
information collection and evaluation costs, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny 
and participation, increased likelihood that regulation will withstand judicial review, reduced 
opportunities for manipulative behaviour by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of 
social dislocation and ' forum sho ping" resulting from competitive disadvantages benveen 
geographical regions or between Rrms in regulated industries as advantages of the current 
system over those proposed by economists and others. Latin, supra at 1271. 
25 See Peat Manvick and Partners, "Economic Incentive Policy Instruments to Implement 
Pollution Control Objectives in Ontario" (1983). M. Stone, "Pricing Pollution: Revising 
British Columbia's \Vaste Discharge Permit Fees," (Victoria: B.C. Ministry of the Environ- 
ment, 1990). 
26 h,f. Rankin, supra note 17; Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. S t e m ,  in a reply to Latin, 
supra, note 24, "Reforming Environmental Law" (1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333; D.N. Dewees, 
"Regulating Environmental Quality" in D.N. Dovees, ed., The Regulation of Quality: Products, 
Services,  workplace^, and the Environment (Toronto: Bunenvorrhs, 1983) at 149. 
27 A polluting firm or municipality would be required to deposit a sum of money with a secure 
governmental or private financial institution at  the time an abatement rogram is a reed upon. 
As the program is completed, the money is rehnded until it is p i d  baciin full. ~aifure to meet 
deadlines or to achieve the specific results targeted could result in forfeiture of the monies. 
2" comprehensive survey and assessment of the North American and international ex erience 
with emission fees is concained in M. Stone, "Pricing Pollution: Revising British Co f' umbia's 
Waste Discharg Permit Fees" (Victoria: B.C. Ministry of the Environment, 1990) at 132. See 
also R Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste" (1988) 12 Harv. 
Environmental Law Rev. 213. 
29 The most~vell known of the emission tradingprograms now operating is that established by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency in the early 1980s. See 44  Fed. Reg. 71779 
(Dec 11,1979) (Original Bubble Policy) and Revisions to EPA's offjet policy, Fed. Reg. 3274 
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schernes,3O tax incentives?' and other efforts to harness market forces, 
such as government procurement policies?' In the end, the array of 
economic instruments and other non-coercive governmental programs 
available to generate environmental benefits is limited only by the 
imagination of the regulator.33 
The utilization of the marketplace for the furtherance of the environ- 
mentalist agenda offers a number of previously unexplored advantages. 
The basic case for the market solution lies in its flexibility: 
its ability to guarantee the maximum of environmental improvement for any 
p'vm amountspent on it, or, to view it the other way around, its ability to 
guarantee the minimum cost for any given amount of environmental im- 
provement. Analysis of the causes of environmental degradation (or waste of 
(January 16,1979); 45 Fed. Reg. ~2676 (August 7,1980) and 51 Fed. Reg. 43814 (Dec. 4,1986) 
(Final Emissions Trading Policy). By 1986 the EPA had directly approved or proposed to 
approve 50 bubbles, saving users an estimated $3oo,ooo,ooo over the cost of conventional 
controls. See Environmental Protection Agency, "Emissions Tradin Status Report," January I, 
1986. See generally, R. Hahn and L.  ester, "~arketable Permits: ~ f e o r y  and ~ractice," (1989) 
16 Ecology Law Quart. 380. 
3 O  Under such schemes, emission standards, schedules and deadlines would be established b the 
Ministry in the usual manner with prosecutions, fines and the like available. Firms wou r d be 
liable for predetermined penalties or assessments if they miss deadlines, allowable emission 
levels are exceeded or monitoring or reporting requirements are breached. 
31 These might include product taxes, as well as modifications to income taxes. See M. Stone, 
"Environmental Excise Taxes: Options for British Columbia (Victoria, British Columbia, 
Ministry of the Environment, 1990). Arecent Canadian initiative in this area is an amendment 
to the Income TmAct, (S.C. 1970-71-72 as amend. c. 63) permitting an accelerated capital cost 
allowance for firms that install pollution abatement equipment. This might be extended to 
similarly reward changes in a firm's production processes which achieve the same result. 
32 A recent government initiative in many jurisdictions is the development of government 
procurement policies which demand that suppliers su ply products which are environmentally F preferred as compared to substitutes. One example o government leadership in Canada is the 
policy recently adopted by the City ofWinni eg which has developed a procurement policy to P encourage the use ofproducrs "that have the east harmll  effect on the environment.. . ". See 
'"I'he City of Winnipeg Purchasing Policy with Respect to Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Issues" (1990). 
The Federal government's Green Plan, for all that it has been criticized, includes aclearsignal 
to the effect that the Federal Government will develop a Federal Code of Environmental 
Stewardship which will, among other things "ensure &at environmental considerations are 
integrated into purchasing policies and practices." Canada's Grm Phnfor a Healthy Environ- 
menr, (Government of Canada, 1990) at 163. In the United States under s. 6002 of The Solid 
Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Consemation and Recovny Act (1974, all 
purchases exceeding $~o,ooo fcertain designated items must contain minimum percentages of 
recovered materials. The Environmental Protection Agency has set guidelines for concrete 
containing fly ash, lubricating oils, re-refined oil, retread tires, and building insulation 
products. 
33 The United states Environmental Protection Agency, for example, in addition to adjudicating 
violations of environmental legislation, "imposes civil penalties for violation of certain regula- 
tory re uirements; rants and revokes licenses for the marketing and use ofpesticides; monitors 
and pu%licizes polktion levels throughout the nation; issues general regulations specifying 
re uired pollution-control measures; inspects polluters' records and operations; makes substan- 
ti 3 grants for municipal waste-treatment plant construction and for environmental research; 
utilizes the environmental impact statement rocess of the National Environmental Policy Act 
Stewart, supra, note 8 at 6. 
J to influence the environmental policies of o er governmental agencies; and so on. Breyer and 
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natural resources) is based on what economist have long known in theory, 
and have often observed in practice: when individuals have property rights 
in a resource, they tend to use it less wastellly than when the resource is held 
in common. The foundation of most market-based techniques is to force 
users to calculate the social consequences of their use of a common-property 
resource by monetizing those consequences and imposing that cost on the 
firm, or to create property rights where these would not otherwise exist.34 
Even a cursory review of regulatory developments over the past 
decade indicates that calls for the privatization of environmental regula- 
tion have moved through several stages. The first stage .was the use of 
incentives-effluent charges and the like-reflecting, simultaneously, 
market ideology and pragmatic instrumentalism. The most recent stage 
in this metamorphosis is that of using the markets themselves to deliver 
the environmental goods and, in particular, using markets for goods and 
services to respond to demands for environmental quality.35 
111. THE PROBLEM WITH MARKETS 
The privatization of environmental regulation through the use of mar- 
kets cannot, however, be taken to be the entire game, and there are a 
number of disturbing reasons why such a policy may ultimately fail. 
First, there is a certain internal contradiction in a policy that operates 
through goods and services markets while attempting to reduce patterns 
of producer and consumer consumption.36 Specifically, producers wish- 
ing to masimize profits can hardly be expected to decrease inputs3'while 
purchasers attempting to maximize their utility are being asked to 
consume less. There is a necessary contradiction benveen a policy that 
3.1 Richard G. Lipsey, "Greening b Market or by Command!: Rapporteur's Report and Com- 
ments" in G. Bruce Doern, e l ,  The Enuironmmtal Imperative: Market Approaches to the 
Grzening of Canah (Toronto: C.D. Hovre Institute, 1990) at 1x8. 
35 Such a shift is not discernible in any governmental programs, policies or regulatory schemes. 
The lack of such intervention is, of course, further evidence that governmental will is manifest 
in allowing the consuming public to determine the amount of environmental benefit through 
the marketplace. This idea is further reinforced by the massive expansion in 'enviro-marketing' 
practices by private enterprise, and the level of success which they are ex eriencing. 
This is not to suggest that there is no further place for governmentafregulation. Strict 
standards may often fbster competitiveness by encouraging com anies to re-engineer their 
technology. The result in many cases is aprocess which not only PO If utes less but lowers costs or 
improves quality. See Michael E. Porter, 'Essay: America's Green Strategy" ScientijicAmerican, 
(April 1991) at 16s. 
3" I discuss the use of the market as a regulatory instrument to reduce demand for environmentally 
costly products in Part VI. 
37 Of course, I am assuming a static scientific and technological environment within which the 
producers operate. T o  the estent that research and development produce information and 
technology which permit producers to simultaneously increase outputs and decrease inputs, 
they mill do so. 
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must minimize resource demands and pollution emissions, and that 
simultaneously attempts to employ an instrument, such the market, in 
which the relevant actors will often be attempting to increase sales and 
market share. So long as companies seek to maximize their profits, it is 
problematic to expect consumers to minimize their consumption. Put 
another way, although corporate actors will seek to minimize inputs, 
they will do so only insofir as they can maximize profits while maximiz- 
ing their outputs-outputs that are themselves dynamic measures of 
consumer demand, production and sales. Environmental regulation 
may very well require a reduction in outputs-a reduction in consump- 
tion and use by the public that corporate actors will certainly oppose. 
Thus, we cannot rely on producers to effect the necessary reduction in 
inputs and consumption given that they themselves are major con- 
sumers (and so must they be in order to continue to pr~duce).~' 
A further explication of this point involves something of a syllogism. 
If a corporate entity states that it is reducing and conserving, consuming 
less in the manufacture of its finished product and by so doing support- 
ing a reduction in the depletion of resources, it is in fact reducingcosts, 
all of which is in its own best interests as a producer. Given a strong 
market for its environmentally beneficial products, the same producer 
will ultimately increase inputs as its sales increase. At the same time, 
when the consumer expends effort to consume less, this reduced con- 
sumption may well be good for the environment but, by clear extension, 
bad for the producer. 
A further problem impinging on the success of environmental regula- 
tion involves the recognition that people assume different attitudes, 
beliefs, values and expectations as they assume different roles appropri- 
ate to different situations. Sagoff argues: 
As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own 
interest; with the good of the community, rather than simply the well-being 
of my family. . . In my role as a consumer, . . . I concern myselfwith personal 
or self-regardingwants and interests; I pursue the goals as an individual. I put 
aside the community-regarding values I take seriously as a citizen, and I look 
out for Number One instead. I act upon those preferences on which my 
personal welfare depends; I may ignore the values that are mine only insoh 
as I consider myself a member of the community, that is, as one of 
38 The point was made forcellly, if inadvertently, by the President ofMcDondd's who said that, 
"[ilf a decision will help us sell one more hamburger, I'm willing to make that decision. See J. 
Blount, "Battle of the Clamshells" Report on Business (April 1991) 41. 
39 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth; Philosoply, L w ,  and the Environment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 8. 
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Thus we have another paradox, that of citizens' and consumers' 
calling for increased governmental regulation of corporate polluters, all 
the while consuming and discarding inordinate amounts of goods in 
their daily lives. Or that of voters' electing to office the "environmen- 
tally friendly" political candidate, having acted true to their values in 
their role as citizens, all the while continuing to waste resources in their 
roles as consumers. This inherent and unavoidable inconsistency over 
both the short- and long-term reduces the possible success of any 
market-based environmental regulation in isolation. As Sagoff notes, 
and as I deal with in greater detail in Part Vl, "these problems are 
primarily moral, aesthetic, cultural, and political and . . . they must be 
addressed in those terms."*O 
Markets might also fail if there are substantial numbers of opportun- 
istic free-riders who, while gaining from the environmentally appropri- 
ate choices of others, themselves still refuse to make the personal 
sacrifices required of them to allo\v the market to determine the amount 
of environmental benefit!' Moreover, product markets alone cannot be 
expected to monitor environmental behaviour because they operate in 
conjunction with capital markets that may or may not be operating 
according to an environmental agenda, or that at least may be respond- 
ing to tastes different from those driving consumer-goods m ~ k e t s . 4 ~  
Nor do consumer-goods markets operate independently of organized 
labour. The latter might be expected to oppose policies that result in 
Zbid at 6. I should point out, however, that recognizing that individuals might have different 
preferences depending on the context in which they are making choices does not depend upon 
&a argument that in o i e  case the are altruistic and-in another &If-interested.  ath he;, xvhat6ver 
they are, they are different in &fferent roles. 
"1 This dilemma may verywell result in the disintegration of the market. What is required here is a 
dramatic change in ethics - the reputation of free-riders must be such as to pressure them to 
bear social costs at least equivalent to the environmental costs of their decisions. 
The public at large may not be represented in capital markets and the taste of investors for 
environmend quality might be significantly different than that ofa broadercross-section ofrhe 
community.  en if it were no; investo; preferences must necessarily be filtered throu h 
institutional agents such as ension h d  managers and mutual fund managers who filter k e  
preferences oftheir principJ and, thus, necessarily have to put their own interpretations on the 
environmental demands of their investors. More important, there is the popularly held view 
that corporations should only act according to economic imperatives, leaving it to shareholders 
to use the profits from that activity in any way they see fir. The argument is that managers know 
only that investors demand the maximization of income streams, and any other demand must 
be espressed individually not collectivel Equally imporrant is the knowledge that many 
investors and managers are influenced l' y short term profits, while choices which reflect 
environmental values are often associated with uncertain rofits which, if generated at all, will 
be received at some unknown future date. Finally, in 1 ormation about a particular firm's 
environmental behaviour is complex, not generally known, and cannot be determined without 
a substantial investment of resources and the introduction of highly subjective interpretations 
by investment firms. 
However. caoital markets will resoond to exoected income streams. If consumer markets are, 
in kct, h r ~ l r i r ; ~  environmentally ireferred ;oducts, capital markets should follow, and firm; 
which are successful in the former should Rnd their cost of capital both in equiry and debt 
markets decreasing. 
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substantial shifts in market shares and fluctuations in unemployment 
levels across ind~stries.4~ Markets also fail to take into account demand 
for environmental quality from the impoverished populace of the pres- 
ent and future whose interests-except to the extent that they are 
actually reflected, if at all, in the decisions of current market 
participants-are under-represented in m ~ k e t s . 4 ~  
Finally, and most importantly in the immediate context, sound use of 
markets is put at risk by the self-interested, non-social-welfare maximiz- 
ing behaviour ofproducers who may, innocently or deliberately, exploit 
both the ignorance of the public and the transaction costs of the market 
to their own advantage. Professor Arthur LeK showing brilliant if not 
prophetic insight in his book S~indLin~andSeIZing,~~ described what is 
going on here as a "God con." Phenomenal profits are available to those 
who can sell environmental salvation at practically any price to con- 
sumers, who will gladly pay. Deep concerns about the environment and 
the opportunity to save oneself and the world are intoxicating induce- 
ments to many of us. They offer artists the outrageous opportunity to 
sell something to buyers who cannot possibly discover that they have 
been conned until it is too late to do much about it. What is especially 
disturbing about the environmental congame, is that like the "God 
con," the environmental con permits opportunists not simply to exploit 
consumers' private greed but also to profit from other-regarding mo- 
43 Aquite well known example of the opposition by organized labour markets to shifrs in demand 
associated with environmental concerns is the experience of Lily Cups with the shifi by 
McDonald's restaurants from polystyrene clamshells to waxed paper. Repom su est that Lily 
Cups was forced to lay off between 35 and 46 people, representing 8 - 10% of its st% because of 
the change in demand by McDonald's. See J. Blount, nr ra, note 38; see also V. Gault, 
"Casualties of the Environmental Wars," GIobe and  ail 4 3  February I 991) Dz. 
The shifi in demand sets up the well-known confrontation between organized labour and 
environmentalists which is played out not only in forests but also in consumer markets. For 
example, the Graphic Communication International Union which represents employees in the 
olystyrene industry states that the 10,ooo workers in that industrial sector feel insecure and are 
'scared that the public backlash against polystyrene might mushroom into the rest of the 
- .~~ 
business." (V. Gadt  at  Dz.) 
employment transferaboth personally and politically more $atable m d t  be developed ro 
counteract the asymmetry. One example of a rivate cor orate transition strategy is the case of 
Lily Cups and McDonald's who together supsidized jo!-search counselling and termination 
pay beyond contractual requirements when some 3~-40 emplo ees of Lily Cups were erma- 
nently displaced as a result of McDonald's decision to shift om polystyrene clams ells to 
waxed paper. (V. Gault at D2.) 
i R 
44 One might find thatwealthier consumers may be moresensitive to environmental risks than are 
poorer consumers. Thus, their tastes would be over-represented in markets for environmentally 
sensitive rodum. However, they may purchase more, ossibly more than offsetting their 
demand g r  environmental uality on a per item basis y increased consumption and the 
commensurate environmen 3 costs. E 
45 A. LeE, Swindling and Selling (New York: The Free Press, 1976) at 56-88. 
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tives, those altruistic concerns for one's community, future generations 
and the planet."" 
What Leff recognizes as operative in all markets, including markets in 
environmental goods, is the immediately recognizable self-interest of 
suppliers when they "sell the environment": 
The green movement is seen by some as an ideal opportunity to market all 
sorts of products that carry an environmentally sound claim but in fact may 
be bogus. Salesmen and consultants will line up outside your door to offer 
you everything from environmentally sound pencils to plastic wrap to waste 
a~dits.4~ 
Misleading advertising harms more than just the individual who 
mistakenly purchases a product or service unaware of its real environ- 
mental characteristics. Of far greater concern, however, is that misinfor- 
mation may generate considerable harmful cynicism about all 
environmental claims, including responsible ones. This cynicism, cap- 
tured by the truism that "bad money drives out good," detracts from the 
benefits of private-market and government initiatives that attempt to 
use market and purchaser preferences to generate environmental bene- 
fits to be enjoyed by the public at large, to effect an environmental good. 
The quite understandable inability to distinguish accurate information 
from misleading information means that most if not all such informa- 
tion could be discounted by purchasers, substantially reducing the 
expected return on othenvise desirable investments in research and 
development, product design and packaging, transportation systems, 
and other areas."' Distrust of such information, without regard to its 
accuracy, creates a situation that is fundamentally worse than the fraud 
or theft resulting from misleading or inaccurate claims about the non- 
environmental attributes of products. Because the very point of the 
46 Of course, it may be possible that businesses would disclose the misleadin information 
lt disseminated by dishonest competitors. However, that has not been acommon p enomenon in 
advertisin in eneral.Aswel1, ifconsumerscannor affirm the accuracy ofany claims, onewould 
have to as \ w k y they would they chose to believe the "honest" competitor. 
f l  B. Fleming, "Reducing Environmental Impacts and Creating Environmentally Preferred 
Producrs," (4th Annual Purchasing Management Conference, "Institute for International 
Research," 26 February 1991) at 8. (Paper on file at the University of British Columbia.) There 
have been several notable examples of alleged private exploitation of consumer demand for 
environmentally sensitive products. I describe numerous examples of these in the paragraphs 
below. Others are contained in "Time to Regulate the Environmental Bandwagon," Ottawa 
Bwiness News (12 August 1989) 9. 
A recent survey of 1,400 shoppers in Britain indicated that 56% of those surveyed are now 
suspicious of claims that products are environmentally friendly, up from 43% the previous year. 
Furthermore, the proporrion of people who said they werelviuing to buy green products even if 
such products underperform conventional alternatives had dropped from 24% to 18%. See 
"Friendly to \Whom!" (7 April 1990) The Economist 83. 
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green-advertising exercise is to ensure that environmental information 
is available for consumer use, consumer distrust of that information will 
ultimately result in the collapse ofany market system designed to supply 
it. 
The problem of market dyshction is exacerbated by the fact that 
purchasers acting as environmental planners cannot test the veracity of 
the information disseminated by market actors; environmental claims, 
unlike virtually all other product claims, are not subject to empirical 
testing by the consumer. We are all familiar with the two basic ap- 
proaches to product information verification, namely search and experi- 
ence. Product quality and performance-durability, servicing costs, 
output levels, "fit" with existing systems and products, toxicity, weight, 
tensile strength among others-can be and often are tested and rated 
through the purchaser's experience with the product. While not neces- 
sarily the best method to ensure that one's expectations are met, it is at 
least, available to purchasers. Conversely, many if not most environ- 
mental characteristics-preservation of bio-diversity, reduction of 
ground-water toxicity and carbon emissions, among others-are not, 
and might never be, verifiable through product end-use. The impos- 
sibility of verifying environmental claims creates incentives for pro- 
ducers to supply misinformation; the necessity of independent pre- 
purchase claims verification therefore, is increasing in urgency and 
importance. 
The claims verification problem is far more serious than might first 
appear. It is obvious that the use of inaccurate or incomplete environ- 
mental information to influence purchasing decisions represents a co- 
erced transfer of wealth from purchasers to suppliers. Purchasers whose 
expectations of environmental benefits are not fulfilled are being de- 
prived of wealth non-consensually, given that their consent to the 
purchase was obtained as a result of misleading information about the 
environmental characteristics of the products purchased. But individu- 
alized losses represent only the most trivial of problems in light of the 
systemic market and environmental consequences of misleading adver- 
tising. The comparative inability of consumers to verify environmental 
claims means, unfortunately, that the immediate results of using envi- 
ronmental products and adjusting life-styles so as to reflect that interest 
and of "doing one's bit for the planet" although manifest are not readily 
realizable. In fact, the beneficial results of large numbers of consumers 
changing their behaviours may not be evident even within those con- 
sumers' lifetimes. Given that fact, a distrustful public with no way of 
verifying environmental benefit claims may be prone to ignore even 
those that are legitimately made and to continue to use those products 
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that give the best immediate results, irrespective of their environmental 
value, in their quests to get clothes whiter, dishes cleaner, and infants 
diapered more conveniently, all the while producing increasingly irre- 
medial environmental degradation. 
In Part IV, I explore in detail the market &lure associated with 
information asymmetries in  consumer markets and the exploitation of 
consumer ignorance by producers who market goods based o n  
environment-related information. 
IV. EXPLOITING ALTRUISM: THE PHENOMENON OF 
GREEN ADVERTISING 
Deciding how we should respond to the risks of the environmental con 
game and the systemic environmental degradation that it produces must 
begin with an appreciation of the subtlety and rhetoric of "green 
advertising." The  following discussion represents a brief analysis of 
several ways in which environmental claims might be less than accurate, 
and thus illustrates the complex problem that one must address in  
designing systems to respond to this phenomenon: 
I. Some information about environmental characteristics-although it is 
impossible to know what percentage-might be explicitly inaccurate. 
While one suspects that this may be the case in only a small proportion of 
claims, one will still come across claims that a product is "CFC free" 
when in fact, it is manufactured using CFCs. Or a product said to be made 
from "recycled" fibre is made from virgin fibre. One can find examples of 
products that are described as "non-polluting" but that are disposable and 
that use an ozone-depleting substance in their manufacture. 
2. Some claims are intentionally vague, and thus subject to considerable 
misinterpretation; for example, one can point to numerous claims that a 
product is "environmentally friendly" or "environmentally responsible." 
The kinds of misinterpretation generated by these claims are quite 
complicated. At best, the product represents some reduced risk to the 
environment as compared to one alternative elected by the producer. It 
may also be, however, that the product does not represent a reduced 
environmental risk compared even to that alternative. And more impor- 
tant, the product will almost always notrepresent a reduced environmen- 
tal risk as compared to another alternative. One can be certain therefore 
that the product does not present an environmental benefit.49 
@'It  might be said that any label which makes reference to the environment will place the roduct Af; in the "good" cateeorv. Plastic bottles of  Lever Brothers' oroducts such as Wisk and carrv a 0~ , 
label wfich says "support plastic recycling". The corn an;, in another label on the back, staies 
that it is now' using technology that can include recyc f ed plastic in our bottles at levels benveen 
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3. Some environmental claims, while not explicitly inaccurate, represent 
implicitly inaccurate information where, for example, they provide irrele- 
vant but still misleading information. One might read claims that a 
product is "CFC free." But if that claim is made in respect of a product 
that was never made with CFCs, one has to ask what h e  motive for the 
claim was. One concern about this kind of claim is that it generates an 
inference from the "CFC free" statement that the product was previously 
made with CFCs and thus that the manufacturer has voluntarily taken 
steps to improve the environment, where no such steps had ever been 
taken? or perhaps where legislation made it mandatory to effect the 
change.$' 
4. A variant on this kind of implicitly inaccurate information occurs when 
suppliers provide accurate information that is misleading because of 
purchasers' unsophisticated knowledge of environmental risks. A product 
may be represented, for example, either through words or images, to be 
"CFC free" when in fact the product contains HCFCs. Here the state- 
ment leads to an inference that the product has no ozone-depleting 
characteristics, when it does, albeit of a type that is less damaging than 
that which it repla~ed.~' 
5. A further variant on the implicitly inaccurate information situation is 
presented by claims which while facially accurate, omit pertinent envi- 
ronmental information. A supplier, for example, may represent that a 
product is "CFC free" where the product uses pentane or another 
z<% and ?s%." Yet nowhere does it state whether anv recvcled olastic is actuallv used in the 
containe&d company officials have admitted that idividud bdttles may or ma; not contain 
recycled plastic. See "Coming Clean on Products: Ecological Claims Faulted" The New York 
Times (I; March 1991) CI. - - 
Eveready Canada Inc. recently backed down from a claim of "environmentally friendly" for 
its alkaline banetv and has reolaced it with "environmentallv safer." The original claim was 
u 
based on the Facithat mercu& content had been reduced i n  the bane by some 90%. The 
switch was made when environmentalists and some competitors (incluxng Duracell Canada 
Inc., which had also reduced mercury content in their product although not to the same extent) 
complained that no battery could be described as environmentally friendly. Alkaline batteries 
contain heavy metals such as manganese and cadmium that could leak from landfill sites and 
contaminate drinkingwater. Some batteries also produce only 2% of the energy that went into 
making them. See "Consumer Update - Green Power" (March 1990) Canadian Consumer 6. 
$0 A similar strategy was demonstrated when an automobile manuFacturer in Britain recently 
advertised one of its cars as being "as ozone-friendly as it is economical" because it runs on 
oline. As was pointed out in the article describing the advertisement, "lead may be i? - bad for t e bmn, but nobody blames i t  for holes in the ozone layer." See supra, note 4. 
51 The claim of "CFC free" is a particularly pervasive example of this type of advertising. Many 
aerosol products make the claim that they use no CFG. In Fact, the use o fCFG in aerosol spray 
cans has been banned in Canada since 1980 due to the damage they do to the ozone layer. T o  
make a claim that one is not using a substance that has been prohibited for eleven years seems 
somewhat self-righteously advantageous, at the least. 
52 HCFC-22 (or Formacel-S, the registered product name of a product distributed by Du Pont 
Canada Inc.) is not as inert as CFC and tends to break up in the lower aunos here where its 
component chlorides can still be washed down by precipitation. It is, over its li F etime, only ~ ? b  
as destructive as CFC, which can be viewed as a 95% reduction in ozone depletion or as a 596 
increase once CFC is gone. It is not benign. See "Earthly Goods" Uuly 1990) Canadian 
Consumer 14. 
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foaming agent. The problematic inference from the statement presented 
is that the product presents no environmental risks in light of the 
displacement of CFCs. In fact, the product does present a range of 
environmental risks, including depletion of non-renewable resources, 
and costs, including energy, solid waste disposal and hydro-carbon emis- 
sion costs.53 
6. Still another variant within this implicitly inaccurate information cate- 
gory is a product claim that the lay public might interpret as an environ- 
mental benefit, but where there is considerable evidence that the product 
represents an environmental cost. Perhaps the most notorious example of 
this involves claims of biodegradability. The problem is that two infer- 
ences from that word may not be true, the first inference being that 
biodegradation occurs. In fact, there are many who would argue that 
biodegradation may not occur in practice given the absence of light and/ 
or air in landf i l l~ .~qhe s cond inference from the statement is that 
biodegradability is beneficial to the environment. But that benefit may be 
more apparent than real. Recent evidence suggest that the environmental 
character of degradable products depends on the by-products of degrada- 
tion, some of which may represent serious environmental risks.55 More- 
53 This is an example of the situation where the maker of the statement fails to take into account 
the environmental costs associated with a substitute component or design. In other words, 
product life-cycle environmental impact assessment involves relative assessments of alternative 
product designs and production processes, not simply an assessment of an individual variable 
associated with a particular component or rocess. Pentane, for example, contains no chlorine 
and will like1 degrade into its component ydrocarbons in the lower atmosphere. However, it r g is itself a vo atile o r p i c  compound and, in large quantities, may be a component in the 
formation of smog. 
5"or e m  le, the Mobil Chemical Company recently sealed out of court a lawsuit brought 
against it gy sis states, led by the Arrorney General of New York The suit alleged that claims of 
degradability made by the company regarding its plastic trash ba s were fake and misleading. 
The company agreed to pay a total of $ ~ p , o o o  and to stop m&ng the claim that the bags 
would photodegrade when used and disposed of in an ordinary manner. The suit contended 
that the bags simply ended up in landfills. See "Mobil Senles on Hefty Bags" New Yurk Times 
(28 June 1991) Dq. 
55 A recent study indicates that many so called degradable products including sandwich bags, 
plastic egg cartons and disposable food containers decompose merely into smaller pieces of 
plastic. See "New Smdy Challenges 'Biodegradable' Claims" New York Times (r March 1991) 
B7. 
# - 
"Biodegradability" clearly implies a reduction of solids into organic matter through a 
biological process. Plastic is a non-organic synthetic, not a biological substance, and therefore 
cannot de rade inm organic matter. Furthermore, to degrade something, micro-ot$nisms 
must be a \ le to digest or wet it. Micro-organisms cannot wet plastic. At best, ey can 
disintegrate it into plastic dust over an indeterminate period of time. 
Recently, starches have been added to the plastic which manuhcturers claim will enable the 
product to breakdown. Scientists have pointed out that this is Fallacious. Micro-organisms need 
air, somethin they will not find in landfill sites, to bredc substances down and anaerobic S bacteria, whi do not require degrade polyethylene. The 
added starch, but not the 
Finally, some argue that in a landfill. Rotting or 
decayin material can that a dump be a 
tomb w f ere things remain inert. 
Most major retailers in Canada have stopped using biode radable plastic checkout bags. 
Shoppers Drug Mart recently announced that they would nojonger be selling biodegradable 
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over, the introduction of degradable plastics into the solid waste stream 
may have signficant adverse environmental impacts if one recognizes the 
impact of contaminated inputs on plastic recycling programs. 
7. A slightly different example of implicitly inaccurate information consists 
of a claim that has not been empirically verified. One can claim, for 
example, that a product is "phosphate free" or that it is "recyclable." The 
problem here is that this is a single-component environmental adjust- 
ment in a situation where a net environmental benefit may not be 
demonstrable, because of pre-existing environmental costs, because a 
substitute design was utilized, or because in practice such products are not 
recycled given current recycling  infrastructure^.^" 
8. A more complicated example of the problem involves information about 
a product reformulation that generates a reduced risk to the environment. 
The representation appears to be accurate but ignores other environmen- 
tal risks. One might imagine, for example, a situation where a claim of 
"phosphate free" is made for a product that is free of phosphate, and 
where the subtitute component is environmentally benign. Such a claim, 
however, may still represent a single-component environmental adjust- 
ment with a marginal environmental improvement, at the same time 
generating a significant shift in market share or price without a 
correspondingly significant improvement in environmental quality. The 
difficulty here is that purchasers (and for that matter governmental 
regulators) are unable to quantitatively assess the environmental improve- 
ment, given its marginal nature and the time-span over which the 
improvement will take place. This inability may mean that the purchaser 
is paying too much for the impr~vement.~~ 
garbage ba s when their current supplies run out on the basis that they "don't really make a 
valid conttgution to the environment." See "Earthly Goods" (July 1990) Canadian Consumer 
12. 
See also L.R Krupp, "The Biodegradability of Modified Plastic Films in Controlled 
Biological Environments" (Masters Thesis, Cornell University, 1991) [unpublished]. 
56 The concern about recyclability being misleading because of the fact that the infrastrucrure for 
recyclin is not in place is in pan the reason behind the public concern about McDonald's 
claims &at its polystyrene containers were recyclable. While there were pilot collection 
programs in place in limited locations, the vast majority of polystyrene was not, in fact, bein 
recycled. Furthermore, even if polystyrene was bein collected, it was not evident that it woul J % be economically recycled into new products. Fin y, a substantial portion of the polystyrene 
used in McDonald's restaurants is removed fiom the premises by the consumer and, thus, does 
not enter the recycling stream. Other concerns about recyclability claims involve omittin 
information about the continuing emission problems surrounding polystyrene production an ! 
omitting information about the use of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC's) to replace chloro- 
fluorocarbons (CFC's) in the manuhcturing process. See J. Blount, supra, note 38. 
57 Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the addition of environmental claims to items which 
tander to aspecific audience and, perhaps, tend to add a note of forgiveness to the modern sin of 
conspicuous consumption." TheTerraVerde Trading Co., for example, markets toasters that 
the store sa are made to last a lifetime. Part of the display includes a label which reads, "Eve 
appliance gt can be fixed is one less iece ofjunkin the landfill." o he toasters cost $240 (u.s~ 
for a nvo-slicer and $320 (U.S.) for a Pour-slicer, aseemin ly high price to pay for even a lifetime 
of toast. See "Environmentally Yours" (17 March 1998 New York Times Magazine 70. 
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9. The final example of implicit inaccurate information is that of image 
advertising. Here we see that a company is concerned about the environ- 
ment through representations in music, general philosophical position- 
ing, colour, and words. It is impossible, however, to know whether the 
entire corporate activity is generating environmental benefits or even 
reducing environmental risks, and one has a very red suspicion that the 
reality might be quite different from how it has been p~rtrayed.~' 
Since this brief narrative description of "green marketing" cannot 
possibly convey the same power of the fdl range of visual and sensory 
images now employed to persuade consumers to base their purchase 
decisions, at least in part, on environmental  concern^.^' But it does 
confirm that markets in "green information" are not yet perfect and will 
not likely develop to perfection for several reasons. First, we will never 
eliminate the self-interest of suppliers who are making these claims. 
Second, purchasers, except in the context of the most substantial pur- 
chase decisions, cannot make the required investments in research and 
analysis to assess the information and thus monitor and correct supplier 
misinformation. Third, the scientific and technical environmental data 
on which the claims are made are rapidly evolving, increasing the 
likelihood of even well-intentioned suppliers' making substantial errors 
in environmental impact assessment and biasing the information they 
disseminate in turn to pur~hasers.'~ 
The obvious risks associated with these purely private environmental 
marketing claims have led to a number of initiatives, both public and 
private, aimed at assisting in the development of more accurate, com- 
58 The continuing efforts of major manufacturers to enhance the image of disposable diapers is a 
well-known esample of this phenomenon. One advertisement which was widely criticized by 
environmentalists showed the life cycle of a disposable diaper based on the 80% compostable 
materials that went into its manufacture. In graphic represenration, the diaper is shown 
disintegrating in a composting process until, in the final event, a sapling is shown sprouting 
from the soil lek from the decomposed dia~er. As one environmentalist commented, trees do 
not grow from diapers! See Alecia Swasy, P&G Gets M i e d  Markets as It Promotes Green 
Image but Tries to Shield Brands" Wall Street Jouml(26  August 1991) BI. 
5' As I noted earlier, however, there is a real risk that all information will be discounted if 
consumers become cyncical about the veracity of the information and are unable to verify its 
accuracy. See supra, note 46. 
" Another problem with ensuring accuracy in environmentally related advertisin which I 
discuss in detail in Part 6, is that the environmental objectives and preferences o F' numerous 
purchasers cannot beex ected to be identical. Suppliersatein theunenviableposition ofhaving 
to supply environmen c l  product information to purchasers who are not uniformly interested in 
the same kind of information. Even if they are interested, they may react in radically different 
ways to the same dam. 
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parable and verifiable environmental information to be made available 
to purchasers. I will briefly review some of the more important responses 
to the kinds of marketing activities described above. 
V. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTXL 
CLAIMS 
There are two obvious roles for the state in a world where private 
markets are employed to deliver environmental benefits.6' The first is to 
create new and recognize existing private property and contract entitle- 
ments in activities that generate environmental benefits. These would 
include ownership, through trademark and patent protection, of the 
output of research and development in environmentally sensitive prod- 
ucts, and, under legal protection, inclusion of applicable standards of 
environmental quality within the bundle of product attributes to be 
marketed to purchasers. The latter would necessarily mean that pro- 
ducers would be encouraged to inform prospective purchasers of the 
environmental benefits associated with their purchase decisions. The 
second and more obvious role of the state is the role governments take in 
assisting producers and consumers to assure that information about the 
environmental characteristics of products and services is accurate. 
Given the myriad ways in which markets do not work, one critical 
and continuing role for governments would seem to be called for in 
assisting consumers and corporate planners to assess critically those 
environmental claims being made by suppliers. Several possible re- 
sponses to the problem of exploitation and misinformation that con- 
sumers face present themselves. These range from the institution of 
direct, coercive regulation in the form of prosecutions under the federal 
Competition A d 2  to purely private initiatives, including the develop- 
ment of sophisticated product life-cycle environmental impact assess- 
ments by manufacturers. Pragmatic arguments can be made to the effect 
that each of these responses has an appropriate place in addressing the 
6' Of  course, governments are necessarily implicated in markers in a variety of ways through the 
recognition of intellectual property rights, in decisions to influence capital investments and 
research and development &v&unentsfSthrough, for example, tax policy,-governmenc procure- 
ment policy and in promoting environmental education policies. 
62 RS.C. 1985, c. C-34, as am. S.C. 1986, c 26, s. 19 (formerly Combines Investigationh). Other 
federal legislation, such as the TextikLabeUingArt, RS.C. 1985 c. T-10, the FoodandDnrgsAct, 
RS.C. 1985 c. F-27, and the Commer PackagigandLabeffingArt, RS.C. 1985, c. C-38, also 
contain provisions with consequences for commercial advertising. Provincial legislation such as 
the British Columbia T r d  Practice Act, RS.B.C. 1979. c. 406 and the Ontario Businm 
PracticesAct, RS.O.1980, c. 55 hrther constrain fslse or misleading advertising by commercial 
interests. 
The applicability of this secondary federal legislation as well as the relevant provincial 
legislation to misleading environmentally related advertising, raises essentially the same issues 
as the Competition Act; therefore, I will be addressing my remarks to that legislation. 
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problems associated with the publishing of environmental product 
claims by the private sector. 
The most coercive response of governments is increased direct regula- 
tion of misleading information under provincial trade practice legisla- 
tion and federal misleading advertising legi~lation."~ There is some 
evidence that this may in fact be happening now. The Director of 
Investigation and Research under the Competition An noted in April 
1990 that the federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
would be employing the Act to deter "vague, incomplete or irrelevant" 
claims that may confuse purchasers and that may diminish the cred- 
ibility and effectiveness of such ad~ertising.~ The current legislative 
framework at the federal level, however, treats misleading advertising as 
a criminal offence, thus demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the commission of the offence and utilizing the criminal justice system 
as the enforcement in~titution.6~ Given current enforcement policy and 
'3 A complete discussion of the success or failure of the urposes of the misleading advertising 
sections of the Competition Act is beyond the scope of $is aper. There are, however, statistics 
indicative of enforcement policy which are readily avai I' able and of interest here. Section 
5z(1)(a), the section most directly referent to the promulgation of false or misleading advertis- 
ing, has only resulted in prosecutions since its inclusion in the Combines Investigation Act in 
1969. Since 1969, the section has been used in much more vigorous fishion. The most recent 
issue of the Canada, Department of Consumer and Cor orate AfFairs, Mis&adingAdveniring 
Bttlletin ~Tanuarv - March IWI). for examole. shows a to m! of 66 convictions resulting from 282 
chug,es Gr the Lurrent fiscxy& for violitions of the misleading advertising provis&ns of the 
Art. This total is consistent with the to& from the previous eight to ten years. See V. Black, 
in& note 65 and accompanying test. - 
C.' See Gnada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AfFairs, "Environment-related Advertis- 
ing (Green Advertising)" MrikadingAdvertisingBulktin (April-June1.990) ar1.The difficulty of 
applying eneral misleading advertising legislation to environmental advertising has led at least 
one juris8ction to introduce legislation directed specifically at the problems generated in this 
contest. In 1990, the California legislature enacted a bill which amended the Business and 
Profiijions Code. The bill extends the truthful advertising laws by requiring that products sold 
with environmental impact claims meet specified criteria. It defines the terms "ozone friendly," 
"biode radable," "photodegradable," "recyclable" and "recycled" for the purposes of advertis- 
ing an ti also requires that persons making general environmental claims about their products 
(e.g. "environmentally friendly," "eco-friendly" or "a green product") maintain records which 
substantiate the claim and which are available to the public upon request. Violaton are subject 
to a term of imprisonment of up to six months or to a fine of up to $2500. 
The definition of "recyclable, ' for example, requires that the article can be "conveniently 
recycled.. . in every county in California with a population over 300,000 persons." It is to be 
noted that upon signin the bill, the governor objected to this term particularly as being 
"impermissibly vague to % e the basis ofacriminal statute because it does not clear1 statewhat is r necessary to meet the test of convenience." He cited other definitions in the bil as either too 
vague or too strict. The major objection is that, in the Face ofsuch vague language, manufactur- 
e n  may forego providing any labels at all (even where the packaging is more environmentally 
friendly thm other packaging). This would be counterproductive to the goal of encouraging 
packaging which is environmentally sound and recyclable. 
65 Section yz(~)(a) of the Competition Act makes it an offence to make any representation to the 
public which is fike or misleading in a material respect. Section 52(1)(b) makes it an offence to 
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the context in which misleading environmental advertising occurs, it is 
unlikely that the Competition Act will be used except in the most 
egregious cases of misleading environmental information. 
A search of the relevant sources has thus far failed to reveal a single 
instance of a prosecution under the federal Competition Act for mislead- 
ing or false advertising in relation to the environmental benefits of a 
product or package. This may change as the use of "green" labelling in 
advertising and promotions increases, and less-than-scrupulous firms 
continue their attempts to manipulate the market through the use of 
incomplete or untrue information. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
prosecutions are, in any event, less likely given the fact that consumers 
do not suffer direct economic losses as a result of claims about the 
environment in relation to a given product. For the most part, prosecu- 
tions under the relevant legislation proceed on the basis of potential or 
direct economic loss to consumers upon the failure or inability of the 
product to perform as advertised. And while s. 36 of the Competition Act 
permits a person who is injured through a violation of the Act to sue for 
and recover any such loss, it is obvious that such litigation in an 
individual case would be time consuming, uncertain and extremely 
expensive relative to the expected gains. Simple altruism might motivate 
a consumer to purchase certain products on the basis of their environ- 
mental characteristics; only super-altruism, however, would motivate a 
consumer to litigate the corresponding misleading environmental 
claims under s. 36 of the Act for the public good. 
Most important, enforcement of the Actis extremely difficult in light 
of the current scientific uncertainty expressed in debate about many of 
the claims made by manufacturers. Much of the uncertainty is due to the 
virtual impossibility of generating credible cradle-to-grave environmen- 
make any representation to the public concerning the performance, efficacy or length of life ofa 
product that is not based on adequate and proper testing. One complication with this section, 
which reveals just how ill-conceived the Competition Anis as an effective regulatory instrument 
in this context, is that it m i p  not even appl to this situation since environmental claims may 
not be claims relating to 'performance, e d' ca or length of life." 
Section 52(3 of the A n  contains the s c h e d x  of penalties for violation of s. 5z(1). Upon 
conviction as an indictable offence, the offender is subject to a fine at the discretion of the court 
or amaximum five years in prison or both. On summary conviction, there is a fine not to exceed 
twenty-five thousand dollars or a maximum one year in prison or both. The average fine per 
charge for violation of s. 52(1)(a) has not been large nor would it seem to be of si nificant 
deterrent effect. In 1987-88, for example, the average fine per charge was $2,393 whi& was in 
line with the averages for the previous eight years. The average fine per conviction was $6,653. 
Fines for corporate offenders were generally larger than those for natural persons. In 1987-88, 
the avera e fine for corporations convicted of violating s. 5z(1)(a) was $7,635 while for 
individwk it was $2,688. See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AlGrs. 
Mishading Advertising BuIletin (1989). 
For a more complete discussion of the provisions of the Competition Act as they relate to 
advertising, with particular emphasis on how the decision to use a criminal law model has 
effected the e of controls which have been developed, see V. Black, "A Brief Word About 
~dvertisin~,'? 1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 509. 
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tal impact analy~es."~ The due-diligence defence permitted in s. 52(1)(b) 
of the Acf7 xvould permit manufacturers to avail themselves successfully 
of the due diligence defence to demonstrate that they took reasonable 
care in assessing the environmental impact of a product, which would 
also present a substantial impediment to successful prosecutions in all 
but the most flagrant violations of the Act. 
Paradoxically, but not surprisingly, we find that the Competition Act, 
which incorporates a command-and-control model of regulatory inter- 
vention, is the primary instrument available to the government in 
dealing with the second-order difficulties produced by an imperfect 
economic regulatory instrument. Nonetheless, because the Act is "en- 
forced" through non-coercive instruments as well as through the crimi- 
nal justice system, it remains of considerable interest as a regulatory tool 
in addressing the problems associated with misleading environment- 
related advertising. In particular, companies engaged in environment- 
related advertising can and should appreciate that the Bureau of Com- 
petition policy focuses primarily on ensuring compliance through in- 
itiatives in communication and education. One aspect of the Bureau's 
compliance policy is the proffering of advisory opinions to suppliers 
who wish to avoid coming into conflict with the Act:' Although not 
binding, the Director of Investigation and Research takes into account 
prior case law, outside legal opinion and departmental policy in con- 
sidering whether a specific marketing or advertising practice violates the 
misleading advertising provisions of the Act." A recent example is the 
advisory opinion issued by the Department suggesting that any general 
claim, such as "Environment Friendly," that implies an environmental 
benefit "should be used with extreme caution and be made m e a n i n g  
by providing specific product characteristics that set out the reason for 
the claimed benefit."70 
66 I describe the intractable problems of producing reliable product life-cycle analyses in Part V. 
67 The Supreme Court of Canada in the recent decision of Whoksak Travel Group v. R (24 
October 1991) file nos. 21779, 21786, upheld the constitutionality of the "reverse onus" 
provision ofs. JZ of the Competition Act. Seven members of the Court held that the reverse onus 
rovisions violated s. rr(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying the accused the 
genefits of a pmumtion of innocence in a prosecution under the Act. However, three of those 
seven found the reverse onus provision justified under s. I of the Charter, and these three, 
combined with the nvo members of the Court who found no violation ofs. I I ( ~ )  constituted a 
majority in the result upheld the constitutionality of the provision. 
See, for esample, note 70 and accompanying text. 
G9 The Department's compliance and enforcement policy is described in detail in Canada, 
Depattment of Consumer and Corporate AEairs, Director of Reseatch and Investigation, 
Competition Act, "Program of Compliance," Information Bulletin No. 3 (June 1989). 
70 See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AEairs, "Summaries ofAdvisory Opin- 
ions" MiskadingAdvertising Bulktin (January-March 1991) at 8. The Bulktin goes on to specify 
that: 
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The deployment of advisory opinions and communication strategies 
to displace the criminal justice system in achieving the regulatory 
objectives of the Competition Acts misleading advertising provisions is 
believed by most to be an important advance in regulatory poli~y.~' This 
framework of moderated negotiation and planned communication be- 
tween the regulatory agency and the private sector has culminated in the 
development, undertaken in cooperation with the federal Department 
of Consumer and Corporate Mairs, of voluntary codes of advertising 
practice that are intended to address misleading environmentally related 
advertising in Canada. 
A second response to the difficulties that consumers confront in assess- 
ing environmental claims has been the development of codes of adver- 
tising conduct either by regulatory agencies, as in the United States7' 
and Britair~,'~ or by cooperative government-industry initiatives, as in 
Canada.74 The Canadian Department of Consumer and Corporate 
Moreover, the claim shouldalso indicate whether it is related to the product or the packagin 
materials. In addition, a re resentation that conveys a message of overall environmen taf 
benefit due to the absenceof!substance known to be environmentally harmful should nor be 
used unless it can be demonstrated that the product is less damaging overall to the 
environment as a result of the absence of that substance. That is, it should not contain any 
other substances that are equally or more damaging to the environment. 
This advisory opinion specifically takes into account the Guiding Principles for Environ- 
mental Labelling and Advertising, which the Director has stated will be considered in the 
application of the misleading advertisin and deceptive marketing practices provisions of the 
Competition A a  particularly ss. 52 ($(a7 and gz(~)(b). 
and Corporate Mars, Efectiue and Equitable Enforce- 
on Amendments to the Misleading A d u h i n g  and Deceptive 
at 7-10 and Canada, Department of 
for Administrative and Civil 
A.W. Nielsen and Edward P. 
Belobaba) (1981). 
72 See Attorney Generals for California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin, "THE GREEN REPORT 11: Recom- 
mendations for Responsible Environmental Advertising" (May 1991). 
73 In addition to voluntary codes of practice in Britain, certain media advertising is subject to 
a proval by a regulatory authority. The Independent Television Commission established under 
t i e  Broadrasting An. 1990 has issued a drafi Code which provides that: 
No advertisement may encourage behaviour prejudicial to the protection of the environ- 
ment.. .All claims relating to environmental impact must comply with guidelines approved 
by the Commission from time to time for this purpose. 
The ITC must clear all television advertisements through its ITA COPY CLEARANCE 
SECRETARIAT and may seek justification for environmental claims before allowing an 
advertisement to be transmitted. As well, it may respond to consumer complaints and take 
appropriate action afrer inquiring into the relevant circumstances. 
74 Industry self-regulation is generally an amalgam of three categories: promotional (designed to 
benefit, foster or enerate commercial activity within the indust ); standard setting (promul- i gated to protect t e public from unethical practitioners); and en 7 orcement. Although wmpli- 
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Affairs, for example, recently initiated and participated in a 
government-industry initiative designed to produce a code of green 
advertising that will provide guidance to industry in an effort to pro- 
mote veracity and enhance comparability of marketing claim~.'~ This 
joint government and industry task force resulted in the issuance in 1991 
of the Guiding Principlesfor Environmental Labelling and Adverttiin- 
guidelines that were held out as assisting (although certainly not resolv- 
ing the difficulties of) those purchasers unable to assess critically envi- 
ronmental product claims.'' 
The Principles, which are to be adopted by the wide range of industry 
sectors involved in their development, direct that: 
ance with such regulation is voluntary and non-statutory (as distin uished from those 
professions and industriesmhich require adherence to statutory schemes oEelf-regulation, such 
as physicians and surgeons, lawyers, engineers, teachers and stockbrokers), governments ma 
maintain their legislativesupervision but play a residual role. As ~ r .  ~ustice ~ o u ~ l a s  remarkel 
"Government v:ould keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, 
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." (RS. Karmel, 
"Securities Industry Self-Re ulation - Tested by the Crash" (1988) 45 Wash. & L.R 1297). 
Support for schemes of sek-regulation includes the arguments that not only is the taxpayer 
seemingly spared the cost of regulation, but the industry is more efficiently policed by those 
with the greatest expertise and knowledge-members of the relevant industry. As the codes are 
volunnr): it is thought that industry members will more closely adhere to the spirit of the 
regulations and not attempt evasive, lawyerly tactics to avoid compliance. The non-statutory 
nature of the re latory scheme also circumvents the expense, delays and complexities of the 
legal system. ~eKregulation is better designed to address ethical, as op osed to legal, conduct 
latitude in addressing a given set of issues. 
R and is ofien more flexible than any scheme of governmental regulation t us allowing for greater 
These perceived benefits are countered by arguments that self-regulation is subject to bias 
and conflict of interest charges in the application of the regulations as firms serve as jud es in f their own cause. Furthermore, the public is generally very poorly represented in any en orce- 
ment procedures. Self-regulation has also been criticized for serving as a barrier to entry for new 
competitors unable or unwilling to meet unrealistic or self-serving standards set by an en- 
trenched industry. As well, enforcement of self-regulatory codes is commonly done privately, 
thus attenuating the powerful reputational effects of public enforcement mechanisms. Finally, 
self-regulation throu h voluntary codes often Fail to respond to systemic problems within an 
industry i n s o b  as t l! e focus only on individual violations of the standards. 
See generally M. ~ i k e n e ~ ,  "Leaving the Field - Government Regulatory Agencies and 
Media Self-Regulation" (1986) 9 University of New South Wales L.R 53 and RS. Karmel, 
supra. 
75 A similar initiative has been taken in Britain by the Committee ofAdvertising Practice (CAP). 
In February 1990, the Advertising Standards Authority of CAP issued a guidance note 
addressin environmental claims which is substantially the same as the guidelines recently 
publishe%in Canada. See Lovel, White and Durant, "Marketing the Environment, A Guide to 
Led Issues Concerning 'Green' Advertising and Labelling" (on file at the University of British 
Columbia). 
76 See Canada, Department of Consumer and Corporate AfLirs, "Guidin Principles for Envi- K ronmental Labelling and Advertising" (1o91). The trade associations invo ved in developing the 
. <, . 
principles includedvrhe~ssociationuof Canadian~dvertisers, the Canadian~dvertising'~o;nd- 
ation, the Canadian Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association, the Canadian Council of 
Grocery Distributors, the Canadian Manuhcturers of Chemical Specialties Association, the 
Consumers' Association of Canada, the Grocery Products Manuhcrurers of Canada, the 
Packaging Association of Canada and the Rerail Council of Canada. In addition, there was late 
and limited consultation with some environmental groups, legal firms industries, foreign 
governments and all levels of government in Canada. 
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I. Industry is responsible for ensuring that any claims and/or represent- 
ations are accurate, and in compliance with the relevant legislation. 
2. Consumers are responsible, to the extent possible, for appropriately 
using the information made available to them in labelling and 
advertising, thereby enhancing their role in the marketpla~e.~ 
3. Environmental claims and/or representations that are ambiguous, 
vague, incomplete, misleading, or irrelevant, and that cannot be 
substantiated through credible information andlor test methods 
should not be used. 
4. Claims and/or representations should indicate whether they are re- 
lated to the product or the packaging  material^?^ 
The Principles encourage marketing claims that include specific and 
quantifiable information and that exclude absolute claims. In addition, 
the Principles explicitly address current marketing activities involving 
such claims as "Recycled," "Recyclable," and "Degradable" and further 
direct precisely how and in what circumstances those words may be used 
in marketing pr~grams.~'The Principlesare to supplement the Canadian 
Code ofAdvertising Standard enforced by the Standards Division of the 
Canadian Advertising Foundation-a wholly controlled industry as- 
sociation. They will also be considered by the Director of Investigation 
and Research in the application of the misleading advertising and 
deceptive marketing practices provisions of the Competition Act, which 
remains the major avenue of enforcement in this area. 
77 The preamble, however, goes further and provides that 
while detailed technical roduct information is not always readily available, there are a 
number ofsources for cre 8, 'ble information that will assist consumers to become informed on 
the various waste reduction and recycling programs available within their communities. 
This statement reveals a certain naivety in the drafters of the guidelines. It is lek unstated where 
one may obtain that information or how it might be linked to consumers' purchase decisions. 
Also, the question of lack of information is much broader than lack of knowledge about the 
presence of waste management programs. 
78 Ibid at 7.  
79 An example oftheway in which theGuidelinesmight operate can be taken from their treatment 
of the concept of "recyclable," The Guidelines provide ac 10 that 
extreme care should be taken when making the claim of recyclabili on products or material ?' for which a recycling infrastructure does not generally exist. C aims of recyclability by 
industry (retailers, manuFacturers and distributors) should not be made simply because the 
material is technically recyclable. (emphasis added) 
The message, of course, is that vague claims of environmental benefit cannot be made unless the 
claims are founded upon appro riate and reliable scientific and technological information 
which is substantiated and verifiagle in p he weakness ofthe ~uidelines is that they do 
not set standards for the use of thii or other terms. In comparison, the State Attorney-Gene& 
Task Force Report recommends that such claims only be made "in a manner that clearly 
discloses the general availability of the advertised option where the product be sold." See 
Recommendation 2 in nrpra, note 72 at 18. 
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The purported object of the Guiding Principles for Environmental 
Labelling and Advertising is to ensure that those characteristics that 
allegedly make a product a better choice for the environment should be 
rendered obvious to purchasers. This initiative is important to consum- 
ers who need aids to interpreting environmental claims with some sense 
of the meanings accurately attributable to the variety of words and 
symbols commonly used, and who need the advantage of a possible 
enforcement mechanism administered by the Standards Division of the 
Canadian Advertising Foundation. 
Self-regulation through marketing guidelines, however, raises serious 
concerns about the commitments both of ~rivate-sector industries and 
I 
of public-sector regulatory authorities in responding to abuses in this 
area. The Principles are drafted in extremely vague language. Moreover, 
they simply fail to address the enormous range of product-specific 
environmental claims that consumers confront. The Principles are, for 
esample, premised only on the short-sighted view that the problem is 
purely the result of a dyshnctional marketplace. While this is true, 
perfect information alone will not solve the environmental problems 
that are the result of the aggregated purchase decisions of large numbers 
of cor~orations and consumers.s0 
\W;at the Principkslack is an unambiguous signal to industry of the 
elevated standards expected of them once it has begun to exploit 
consumer demand for the environmental good.81 Misleading advertis- 
ing in the area of environmental claims is quite unlike many other 
consumer problems. As I argued earlier, the impact of market dysfunc- 
tion in this case is much more serious than misinformation relating to 
product quality and performance. Consumer errors, taken in their 
aggregate, shape Canada's economy and environment in irremedial 
ways, and it is next to impossible for individual consumers to monitor 
contractual compliance. The Principles should also urge the participa- 
tion of environmental groups and concerned individuals in the enforce- 
ment process.82 
so See Part VI. 
81 The Guidelines' effectiveness might be enhanced if it were made clear that they are linked to a 
much broader regulatory agenda which will include full enforcement ofthe relevant federal and 
provincial statutes which esist to address instances of misleading advertising. The educative 
function of the document should exrend beyond i s  narrow terms and reinforce a more rigorous 
p r o ~ n m  of enforcement than is now apparent, at least in the federal arena. 
- - 
HZ ~hcabsence  of environmental representation in the enforcement process is paralleled by their 
absence in the production of the Guidelines. Althouah there wjs some consultation with 
environmendi;rs: and others, the make-up of the workihg group which developed the Guide- 
lines reveals an ovenvhelming predominance of industry rrade associations. Information about 
the comples \vays in which products and pac ing affect the environment is nor uniquely 
within the understandingofindustry. At thevery ?' east, it  should be incumbent upon Consumer 
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Finally, the Principles reflect only a simplistic and naive appreciation 
of the complexities involved in product life-cycle analysis. They pro- 
hibit, for example, claims of environmental benefit based on the absence 
or removal of an environmentally harmful substance if the product 
contains other substances that are equally or more damaging to the 
environment. The drafters appear to have been optimistic about the 
complexity, certainty, and normativeness of environmental impact as- 
sessment. It is not clear how one would demonstrate or indeed justify a 
conclusion that a particular substance is "more or equally damaging to 
the en~ironment."'~ Similarly, the Application section provides that 
environmental claims, where applicable, are to be premised on appro- 
priate, reliable, and verifiable scientific and technical information. But 
this statement does not go far enough. Prior to their being made in 
public, all statements by industry relating to the environmental charac- 
teristics of their products should be grounded in the verifiable existence 
of a comprehensive product life-cycle environmental impact assess- 
ment. Representations of environmental benefit, if consumers believe 
them, generate inferences that environmental assessment research bas in 
fact been undertaken by the advertiser. The failure of industry during 
the past two centuries to engage in the kind of research capable of 
identifying the environmental costs of product manufacture, transpor- 
tation, use and disposal is one of the reasons we now find ourselves living 
on a planet at risk It would be far better that no environmental claim be 
permitted unless and until that life-cycle assessment has been per- 
formed.84 Lacking a requirement that suppliers assess environmental 
claims on the basis of a cradle-to-grave environmental impacts analysis 
and Corporate A&in to include substantial representation from environmental groups across 
the country on furure work in this area. Such roups can and will bring scientific and technical 
expertise, the organized voice and opinions o thousands of environmentalists, and significant 
legitimacy to the entire process. 
B 
83 Another exam le of the naivety of the draften of the Guidelines is the discussion of "re- 
cyclabiliry", \v[ich indicates a fundamental lack of u n d e m d i n g  of an imporrant environ- 
mental issue associated with recycling. The technical feasibility of recycling is not the critical 
variable in determiningthe environmental characteristics ofa product. T o  determine whether a 
recyclability characteristic is "good", one would have to know the environmental costs of 
recycling, something which, as I point out later, is not easy to demonstrate. As well, the 
supposed environmental benefits associated with recyclability do not come from the collection 
of waste. An impottant benefit of a re clability characteristic is that waste is transformed into 
industrial or consumer oods and, 3: us, reduces demand for renewable or nonrenewable 
resources. Unless both coflection facilities and markets exist within the particular 
area for collected goods, the environmental benefits of "re clability' are not o vious. 2' rgraphical Similarly, the treatment of degradabili ignores consi erable data which suggest that 
de radability may interfere with recycling e % orts and may result in substantial environmental 
risfs associated with the byproducts of degradation.  hat research is now verywell known, and 
the fact that there is little discussion of it confirms the benefits which would be associated with 
implementingsuggestions to include environmental expertise on any further work in this area. 
84 This is, admittedly, onestep funher than what has been recommended in the Unitedstates. See 
Recommendation 1.7 in nrpra, note 72 at 11. 
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of the product or service, the veracity of all environmental claims in the 
meantime must be doubted.85 Ultimately, the enforcement of the Prin- 
ciples becomes as problematic as the enforcement of the misleading 
advertising provisions of the Competition Ach and for similar reasons.86 
The Principles, despite their shortcomings, represent a only a tenta- 
tive first step toward addressing the rapidly expanding growth in mis- 
leading environment-related advertising. But given the serious negative 
environmental impacts generated by this kind of misinformation in the 
consumer marketplace, together with the serious substantive deficien- 
cies of the Principlesas presently drafted and the absence of an indepen- 
dent, public enforcement institution, it is unlikely that this particular 
regulatory instrument alone, at least in its present form, could ever 
address the problem adequately. 
Government intervention in the market place is recognition that for 
consumers to make environmentally appropriate choices when canvass- 
ing the marketplace, they must have easy access to environmental 
impact information that is accurate, reliable and independently verifi- 
able. Just behind regulation and voluntary advertising codes, the third, 
and much more sophisticated government initiative intended to assist 
purchasers in comparing and verifying environment-related product 
claims, is the variety of recently developed public8' and privates8 envi- 
ronmental labelling programs. Such programs represent a relatively new 
85 The document thus directly contradicts the fundamental tenet of environmental analysis 
represented in the Chadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.). As I 
point out in Part V, such analyses are extremely difficult to erform with any degree of 
confidence in their ourcomes. Nonetheless, there is nothin in i e  Guiding Principles which 
product life cycle analyses. 
f would encourage rnanuhcturers to invest the resources in eveloping the methodology to do 
8' See Pan V. 
87 In Canada, the federal government's Environmental Choice Program, established in 1989, 
represents theonly publicenvironmental labelling program now in existence. The history ofthe 
program and its regulatory rationale is described in D. Cohen, "Procedural Fairness and 
Incentive Programs: Reflections on the Environmental Choice Program", (1991) Alberra Law 
Rev. (forthcoming). 
88 While some would argue that a governmental presence in ewlabeling programs is extremely 
important, a purely private initiative has been organized in the United States. The American 
Green Seal program, given themarket impact ofAmerican rnanuhcturers andpurchasers, could 
very well become the standard in North America. A description of the Green Seal program may 
be found in D. Hayes, "Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Earth", (Winter 1990-91) 
Ismez in Scienceand Tecbnologv46. However, private initiatives run the risk of industry-ca rure 
and substantial consumer conhion if environmental standards which lack rigour are &el- 
oped. See "Eco-babble", (21 September 1991) The Economist 84. It may be that, ultimately, we 
will need to develop re atory instruments to address the problems associated with this 
re latory instrument, w f? ich itself is desi ned to address the problems associated with the use B ot6umarkets to regulate the production o environmental quality! 
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example of economic instruments designed to regulate corporate and 
human activity affecting the en~ironment.'~ 
Specifically, these programs attempt to modify producer behaviour in 
product research and development through the creation and distribu- 
tion of a marketable entitlement. In the case of the federal government 
in Canada, this entitlement consists of a license to use an Ecologo,SO a 
graphic signature of the company's commitment to the environment for 
display in its advertising and on its packaging. The primary public 
policy objective of environmental labelling programs is to reduce the 
rate of environmental deterioration through the substitution in relevant 
markets of "ecolabelled" products, services and processes for products 
currently distributed in those markets.9' It is clear that these programs 
can also play an important role in addressing the market dyshnction 
represented by consumer confusion and exploitation related to private 
initiatives involving environmental ad~ertising.~' 
Although the ecolabelling programs now in place in Europe and 
North America are extraordinarily diverse, they nonetheless share some 
hndamental characteristics that have been currently incorporated in the 
Canadian Environmental Choice Program. The Canadian program, 
which is perhaps the most sophisticated and well-developed of the 
existing programs, involves four stages. First, the Environmental 
89 An interesting but naively optimistic proposal for the development of an environmental 
labelling initiative in the United States is found in J.P. Kimmel, Jr., "Disclosing the Environ- 
mental Impact of Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution Control Program Based On 
Individual Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental 
Goals of the 1970s in the ~ggos," (1989) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505. 
The first example of this type of program was begun in West Germany in 1978, apparently at 
least in part in response to a Recommendation adopted by the Council of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1976 which ur ed member countries to 
5 f develop comprehensive waste mana ement policies. The "Blue Ange ' logo is now carried by over 3000 products in some 60 pro uct categories. Canada and Japan were the next to adopt 
such programs, in 1988 and 1989 respectively. Similar efforts are lanned or underway in F Norway, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and, through a number o mainly private agencies, 
the United States. See "Eco-Labels: Product Management in a Greener Europe" (Camberly, 
U.K.: Southwell Press Ltd., 1989), on file at the University of British Columbia and OECD, 
Environmental Labeling in OECD Countrirs (Paris, 1991). 
90 The Canadian Ecologo is a stylized maple leaf formed from the wings of three intertwined 
doves, with "Environmental Choice" and "Choix Environnemental" encircling the leaf. The 
program requires disclosure of relatively specific information respecting the particular environ- 
mental "benefit" associated with the use of the product. 
91 Other public policy objectives might include the development of a subsid program to 
encourage research and development in "environmental know-how" and tednology, with 
resources for the subsidy coming from the marketplace rather than taxation revenues, and the 
eneration of a generalized awareness of the complex links between private consumptive 
gehaviour and the condition of the public biophysical environment. 
92 T o  date, the program has addressed some fifty categories ranging from re-usable diapers to re- 
refined motor oil; from low solvent water-based paints to fine paper products made from 
recycled fibre; and from light bulbs to newsprint. 
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Choice Boardg3 selects and tentatively defines a product category.'* Very 
early on in this process, a life-cycle biophysical-environmental impact 
review of the products constituting the proposed product category is 
~repared.'~ The second stage involves h h e r  development, through the 
Canadian Standards Association (C.S.A.)9G and the voluntary multi- 
sectoral task of the environmental guidelines issued by the 
Minister of the Environment under the Canadian EnvironmentalProtec- 
tion Act. These guidelines, which are based on environmental impact 
assessments, are specific to each product category and address the 
performance and design specifications to which products must comply 
in order that they may be allowed to display the federally owned 
E~ologo?~ After the guidelines have been M y  developed at the task- 
forces level, they are then made subject to review by the independent, 
scientifically competent Co-ordinating Technical Committee and to a 
Go-day public-review process. The third stage follows the promulgation 
of the new environmental guidelines and involves the licensing, for a fee, 
73 The Board is established under s. 5 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Actas an Advisory 
Board to the Minister of the Environment. It consists of fifteen persons and a Chair appointed 
by the Minister for indefinite terms. Currently, the Board consists of representatives of 
consumer groups, environmental groups, several science and social science disciplines and 
industry. 
"4 Product category suggestions are sometimes generated internally within the program. More 
often, the Board d m s  on suggestions from external sources, including product manufacturers 
and suppliers, environmental and consumer groups and individual consumers. Serious concerns 
have been raised by industry about the lack of an early warning system which would inform 
them of prospective categoriq and the absence of a systematic approach to the prioritization 
and rejection of proposed product categories. 
" The Environmental Choice Program, like more formal regulatory authorities and the private 
sector, has had to develop data bases and a methodology to perform product life cycle review 
without the benefit ofa pre-existin body ofknowledge and ex ertise in this field. There can be 
little doubt that the life cycle an af yses and reviavs employe 4' by the Program are subject to 
precisely the same criticisms that have been made about life cycle analyses produced by the 
private sector. See Part V(D). 
"6 Environment Canada has contracted with the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) to 
~rovide this service. The CSA has substantial national and international credibilirv in develo~- 
ing consumer and industrial standards.~~owever, the CSA is simply an adminiitrative in&- 
structure. It provides secretariat services for the task forces which consist of voluntary industry, 
environmental and consumer and government representatives. The CSA does not set standards, 
nor does it engage in research on which the standards are based. 
97 Concerns have been raised regarding the constitution of these task forces. Environmentalists, 
although partially funded, have undoubtedly been under-re resented in the guideline develop- 
ment process. As well, the participation ofsmaller firms has een uneven due, at least in art, to 
the research resources anilable to larger established firms. T o  a limited degree, $e un- 
der-re resentation of those groups has been ofiet by the use of program staff and Environment 
CanaL resources to ensure that all information is subject to independent verification and 
assessment. 
98 In developing the environmental guidelines, Environment Canada has been guided by a 
concern that all roposed roduca andservices encompassed by the pro ram will generateanet 
environmental genefit A n g  into account the entire life cycle of &e service or product. 
Consistent with the complete product life cycle concept inherent in the Canadian Environmen- 
tal Protection Act, the Environmental Choice Program employs a preliminary environmental 
impact assessment of all proposed product, service and packaging categories. 
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of Ecologo use in the product marketing of individual manufacturers, 
importers and retailers that meet or exceed the guidelines. Important to 
the licensing program is product testing and confirmation undertaken 
by the C.S.A. to ensure that a particular product or group of products 
complies with the environmental guideline requirements. This is the 
fourth and final stage, where all licensed users are continuously monitor- 
ed to ensure compliance with the environmental guidelines and the 
terms of their licences. The licencing period is three years, and the 
licensing agreement permits spot-auditing ofmanufacturing plants with 
immediate access to all relevant production and purchase records. 
Sanctions for non-compliance include contract termination, product 
recalls and even damage recovery by the government," but is not clear 
whether non-compliance lists will be made public under this program. 
One can immediately identify several advantages of this form of 
regulation over the command-and-control model, exemplified in the 
Competition Act, and over the employment of industry-dominated 
voluntary guidelines and processes. Environmental labelling programs 
are attempts at generating reliable environmental impact assessments 
across a broad range of products. These product-specific impact assess- 
ments are public records, ,for use by private producers who may be 
completely independent of any association with the public regulatory 
program. The assessments, themselves produced independently of any 
single industry sector, present an extraordinarily valuable data base. And 
if a product life-cycle analysis is incorporated into the environmental 
labelling program, together the analyses provide some assurance that 
purchase decisions will generate environmental benefits. 
Further, environmental guidelines can, and often do, address the 111  
range of environmental characteristics consumers consider in evaluating 
environment-related product logos and conflicting environmental 
claims made by  supplier^.'^^ The use of multi-factorial environmental 
impact assessments and/or multi-factorial environmental guidelines 
substantially reduces the risks associated with uni-dimensional environ- 
mental adjustments that characterize many private initiatives. As well, 
99 See "Environmental Choice Licensing Contract", on file at the University of British Columbia. 
What remains to be answered, however, is whether the enforcement and compliance process 
within environmental labelling rograms will be subject to the same paralyzing poltical 
pressures that have characrerim! environmental compliance and enforcement policies in 
Canada in recent years. 
' 00  For example, Environmental Guidelines on all-purpose cleaners will likely address surhctants, 
builders, solvents, scouring abrasives, stabilizers, disinfectants, bleach, preservatives, pro- 
pellants, perfumes and deodorizers. The Guidelines will likely address a wide ran e of 
environmental impacts including resource and energy use, packaging, chemical and bioPiysi- 
cal im acts, ecological toxicity, VOC levels, biodegradability, eutrophication and aesthetic 
degra8ation, human health risks, delive systems and disposal methods. See "Briefing Note 7' on All Purpose Cleaners," (1990). on fi e at the University of British Columbia. 
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such programs will often ensure that the environmental guidelines 
address non-environmental performance characteristics, thereby also 
addressing the concern that environmental benefits associated with a 
product are not offset by inadequate performance.lO' Also, the guide- 
lines are reviewed tri-annually, ensuring that the standards are both 
current and effective in generating the environmental benefits sought. 
More importantly, this tightening of environmental standards means 
that corporate investment in research and development will be rewarded 
through the development of guidelines that reflect increasingly higher 
standards of environmental performance. 
Perhaps most important of all, environmental labelling programs 
using easily identifiable and verifiable logos reduce purchasers' search 
costs to the absolute minimum. And to the extent that these programs 
also rely on certification, compliance and verification requirements,'02 
they represent a credible signal that the product so endorsed will 
conform to the broad range of environment-related criteria discussed 
earlier. These programs thus reduce the need for consumers to educate 
themselves about the ovenvhelmingly technical, frequently complicated 
environmental issues that must be addressed in environmental 
planning.'03 
lo' For m o l e .  the environmental benefits ootentiallv~enerated bv market shifts to oaints which 
are form;laied to reduce the release of colatile o; ic comp&nds which cont;ibute to the 
formation of local air pollution as well as to glob $" warming is reduced to the extent that the 
performance of such paints require more fresuent use. Thus, environmental idelines must 
incorporate product performance standards to ensure that the environmen 2 benefits of the 
product are, in hct, produced. See Environmental Choice Guideline, "Water Based Paints", 
ECP-12-1990. 
'"2 Under the Canadian program, the Environmental Guidelines are enforced through compli- 
ance and verification measures developed and implemented through the Canadian Standards 
Association, eneraring confidence that the actual products purchased comply with the a guidelines. T us, consumers utilizing the program can have confidence that the specific 
products purchased conform to the product specific environmental criteria contained in the 
applicable Guidelines. In addition, the licensing contract imposes strict self-monitoring and 
reporting requirements with significant penalties imposed for non-notification. Finally, the 
Guidelines demand that licensedsuppliers certify that the are inactual compliancewith local, 
provincial and national environmental legislation. ThereLre, have some indication 
that their procurement decisions, and the profits generated by those choices, are directed at a 
subset of the industry which is not violating mandatory environmental regulations. 
'03 However, environmental labelling programs assume that the environmental preferences of 
consumers can be identified, are generally identical, and are identical to, or com lementary 
with, the environmental objectives of the individuals developing environmentafguidelines 
within the environmental labelling pro rams. Confidence in this kind of regulatory instru- 
ment as an effective and defensible vehicfe to generate environmental benefits is reduced to the 
cstent that the labelling programs cannot kniw the environmental preferences of consumers 
to the extent that the preferences vary significantly across the population and differ from those 
* - 
of the individuals designing the Gdeknes. 
Another, perhaps more fundamental, problem with such programs is that they might very 
well lead consumers to believe that increased consumption will benefit the environment. That 
will rarely, if ever be the case, and the communications policy of the Environmental Choice 
Program attempts to be sensitive to this issue. See "IfYou're in the Market for a Better World, 
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Even from this cursory analysis, what should be obvious about 
environmental labelling programs is that they represent a radically 
different regulatory approach to misleading advertising in comparison 
with the traditional command-and-control instruments developed ear- 
lier in this century and codified under the federal Competition Act. But 
all three of the regulatory responses to misleading environmental 
advertising-mandatory regulations, voluntary guidelines, labelling 
programs-require that either the private-sector actor or the public- 
sector regulator possess data on which to base, respectively, its environ- 
mental marketing claims or enforcement decisions. Without the neces- 
sary resources and methodologies with which to produce reliable 
environmental impact assessments of consumer products and services, 
we have little reason to be confident that either marketplace operation or 
government intervention will be sufficient to generate genuine environ- 
mental benefits. 
What all of this tells us is that the problem we face is not necessarily 
represented by a choice from among different forms of regulation that 
address misleading environmental advertising; rather, much, if not all, 
of the private and public debate surrounding this issue is due to the 
absence of refined, sophisticated methodologies capable of producing 
reliable life-cycle environmental impact analyses'04 of the products and 
services so heatedly discussed. Given all of the ways in which 
environment-related product information can be misinforming, the 
problems brought about specifically by the inability to verify claims 
based on such information are substantial. Put simply, without better 
methodologies, neither private-sector actors nor public regulators have 
any assurance that their marketing and enforcement decisions are 
soundly based on an accurate understanding of the environmental 
impacts of the products and services that are the subject of regulation.'05 
Read On," (16 September 1991) 104 MacLean's Ma ine (insert). However, private sector 
advertising of licensed roducts may very well be g g n e d  to encourage consumption of 
roducts with serious a A? verse environmental impacts. For example, Eveready batteries have 
geen advertisedwith lan ge which suggests that "nothing.. . is kinder to the environment" 
than a battery!. See   lor and ~ a i (  (20 September 1991) A3. 
104 Product life cycle assessment can be defined as the "systematic identification and analysis of the 
environmental and health impacts associated with a product or service through all stages of in 
life cycle". See Marbek Resource Consultants, "Product Life Cycle Assessmenp: Key Issues 
and Options for the Environmental Choice Program," (May 1991) at I. 
10s Virtually everyone who has examined this issue reco these issues must be resolved if 
consumer product markets are to be environmental benefits. 
See supra, note 72 at 11-17 and 
Technical Framework for Life 
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Thus, the most important initiative being taken in response to the 
general needs of the consumers to verify and compare environmental 
claims is the joint development by g~vernment'~' and industry of 
credible, reliable environmental impact life-cycle analyses focused on 
those products and services consumers have come to expect will slow the 
rate of environmental degradation. Development of such analyses will 
go some way tolvard ensuring that producers address the issue of 
potential environmental impacts during the earliest stages of their 
research and development. 
Recent studies by the Environmental Protection Agency, in the 
United States, suggest life-cycle analyses should focus on a broad range 
of environment-related product and package variables, including con- 
tent status as recycled or toxic; potential degradability, recyclability and 
reusability; pollutive impacts on air, water, soil; and, potential for 
energy and other forms of resource con~ervation.'~' Studies elsewhere 
have recommended that life-cycle analyses should comprise nvo distinct 
stages. The first would involve a quantitative inventory of material and 
energy needs, and waste emissions levels (solid, liquid, gaseous, released 
into the air, water and soil). The second stage would involve assessment 
and characterization of the effects related to this material-energy- 
emissions inventory in terms of potential risk to the ecology in general 
and human health, habitats, and aesthetic surroundings in particular.108 
To  the extent that one or more of these environmental variables can be 
106 One of the more important and often ignored initiatives in the National Packaging Protocol is 
the "development of methodologies and guidelines to be used in conducting environmental 
profiles of packaging, allowing users to compare packaging choices." See Canadian Council of 
Ministers of the Environment, National Packaging Protocol, Policy #I. As well, the Protocol 
anticipates that industry will u n d e d e  environmental profiles of their packaging in accor- 
dance with the guidelines. 
One argument in favour of government activity in this area involves the public good 
character of the methodolo involved in car ing out life cycle analyses. Once the methodol- 
ogy is produced, it is diffic 3' t if not impossib 7 e for a private producer to monitor its use, and, 
thus, to capture the profits from its investment in developing the methodology. Simul- 
taneously, once produced, the information can and should be transferred v i d y  costlessl 
from one producer to another. Finally, it is arguable that under-capitalized business, w h i d  
cannot afford the initial investment in developing the methodology, might very well benefit 
most from having access to it. 
Another reason for government involvement in developing the methodolo for life cycle 
analyses is that development of efficient markets in environmental goods willK facilitated if 
the relevant environmental information is presented in a manner which assists urchasers in 
making comparisons across products and services. Comparability is assisted i ! suppliers are 
us in^ a uniform methodology in their product specific environmental assessment processes. 
- -. 
'" See United States, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, 
Risk and Reduction Eneineerine kboratorv, BarkproundDonrrnenton Ckan ProductsResearch 
,- " 
and Implemen~tion (J&e 1 ~ ~ 4 ,  ch. 3. 
108 This stage must ne-ily involve risk assessment, which uses the information in the first 
stage, determines the fate and transport of the releases and then addresses the athways by 
which humans and other organisms will be exposed to the emissions. However, ris 1 assessment 
will nor be useful in addressing some impacts including ozone depletion, greenhouse gas 
impacts, habitat loss and soil loss. See "Framework", supra, note 102, ch. 10. 
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ignored or overlooked in the analyses, consumers, producers and regula- 
tors risk making decisions on the basis of distorted images of the 
environmental impact of relevant products. 
But interpretation and productive use of life-cycle analyses are com- 
plicated processes, requiring approaches ranging from simple pass-fail 
matrices and qualitative impact assessment to more intricate quantita- 
tive weighting assessement schemes.'0g (On the other hand, going no 
hrther than the inventory stage of identifying and quantifying particu- 
lar emissions without concern for environmental impacts is arguably a 
valid approach as well."') Although the methodology may or may not 
acknowledge scientific uncertainty and the interaction of such uncer- 
tainty with raw data, it will always impute assumptions about the mixes 
of technologies used and about the assessment methodologies used to 
transform the data into environmental impact assessments."' Any such 
analysis must acknowledge the assumptions inherent in its 
development-relevant temporal and geographical boundaries; energy 
input mixes; transportation modes and distances; disposal and recycling 
technologies and related facilities; and "hte" environments, such as 
rivers, groundwaters and airsheds."' 
Available information on private-sector development of product life- 
cycle environmental impact analyses indicates that industry is only now 
beginning to develop standard data bases and methodologies capable of 
helping suppliers to evaluate product claims of the simplest (though 
often misleading) order."3 But consumers who act as environmental 
planners, along with regulators, can, and should, demand access to the 
impact assessment results and undertake critical evaluation of them on 
the basis of such ideas as have been presented above. Environmental 
impact assessement studies currently are, and will likely remain the most 
important source of environmental data upon which consumers and 
regulators can rely in making their decisions. 
lo9 Zbid, ch. 4. 
110 See United States, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, 
Risk Reduction Engineering Laboratory, "Technical Work Plan on Development of a 
Consumer Product Lifecycle Analysis Methodolo (August 1990) at 10. There are obvious 
1 Y"' roblems with an inventory a proach which simp y discloses in uts and outputs. At the very fkt, they are subeect to signi cant misinterpretation if readers 1 elieve that they characterize 
the environmend impact of the producr; they appear quantitatively unassailable but are often 
plagued by substantial uncertainties in the data on which they are based; and the use of 
national data can hide regional or site specific variations. These and other related concerns ar 
addressed in an industry workshop document, "LCA Implementation Strategy" (Ad hoc 
Implementation Strategy Planning Committee, 23 August xggo), on file at the Univetsiry of 
British Columbia. 
111 Zbid at 11-12. 
112 See "Framework", supra, note 102 at 31-33. 
113 Zbid; supra, note 104; and The Conservation Society, "Product Life Assessments: Policy Issues 
and Implications," (Washington: The Conservation Society, 1990). 
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VI. PREFERENCE SHAPING AND PROPAGANDA1'* 
For the most part, this article has been formulated upon the optimistic 
premise that consumers, when supplied with appropriate, accurate, 
reliable and verifiable information, will tend to make those purchasing 
decisions most likely to effect the greatest environmental good or, at 
least, do the least environmental harm. There is, one hopes, at least a 
little truth in that premise. One hopes that people, generally, are not 
cynics. Nor are they masochists. They will tend to do "the right thing," 
assuming that to mean doing what brings the least harm to themselves 
and others insofar as they are aware of the harmfd potential of their 
decisions. I have assumed most people to have what is, in the words of 
C L  Terry Eagleton, a fairly sharp eye to their own rights and interests," 
and to be "uncomfortable at the thought of belonging to a seriously 
unjust form of life."'15 Is there any reason to suspect that the vast 
majority of people would be comfortable seeing themselves, even in the 
abstract, as members of a terminally polluting, environmentally haz- 
'1.5 I should ooint out at the outset of this discussion that I am not advocating environmental 
propapn'da as government policy. \Ve wn talk about the role of governme& in providing 
information, intormarion about information, public education, the op o m i t y  for dialogue, 
propaganda and so on, without ever agreeing on when one turns into i e  other. Cate orizing 
the experience of environmend acculturation will not assist us in thinkinp, seriously afout the 
role ot'the state in the production of a particular set of environmental n o h .  I have chosen to 
use the term "propaganda" rather than a less emotionally laden word to bring out for the 
purposes of this paper the veryworst images of a state destroying the freedom of its citizens to 
define for themselves the way they want to live their lives. 
My sense here is that thedispensingofpure Factual information, ifsuch a thing is possible, is 
only a more coven form of propoganda. The very selection of what information to give, the 
manner in which it is presented, the context and medium in and through which it is received 
and so on, combine to determine its meanin . While that means that there is no distinction 
benveen "information" and "education" an2 "propaganda", I think that a persuasive argu- 
ment can be made that we should recognize a distinction in designing regulatory instruments. 
Regulation through information disclosure accepts consumer castes as given and simply 
ensures that the information base on which com arisons are made is as accurate as possible, 
accepting that the production of information itse f f is a costly endeavour. Regulation through 
propaganda refers to something more than the government merely conveying objective Facts. 
Propaganda is a system through which image, colour, and appeals to human emotions are 
employed in complicated ways to persuade consumers that they ought to engage in a certain 
kind of activity. It is not enough to inform consumers that a particular species might be 
adversely affected by their purchase decisions taken in the aggregate. For the market to workas 
a regulatory instrument, consumers must come to care about the existence of that particular 
species, want to take personal steps to assist it, believe that they must change their behaviour 
out of concern for that species and know that they ought to alter their personal choices to 
reflect concern for that species. 
In the case ofconsumer product markets and theenvironment, information might consist of 
data about the number of trees which are reauired to be orocessed to oroduce a consumer rood. 
or information about the biological differekes benve& o~d-~ tow& forests and tree h;s, or 
about the implications on fish resources ofthe forestation ractices of relevant members of the 
forest industry. Conversely, propaganda mi ht consist o /' how the information is communi- 
a ted ,  what i m a m  and emotions are evoked k v  the information and whether the reader should 
care about for& and fish and the natural invironment. 
"5 T. Eagleton, Ideolg: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991) at 27. 
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ardous life form, a life form that through its wastefullness and ineffi- 
ciency is befouling its planet and killing itself? 
The answer to that series of questions is obviously no, yet the 
problems of indiscriminate pollution, hazardous waste and inefficient 
use of resources continue to plague us. And the marketplace holds 
- - A 
alluring solutions, some of them pragmatically persuasive. But to leave 
the inference that marketdace mechanisms alone could suffice to allevi- 
ate our environmental ill; would be to misread this DaDer and much of 
what has peceded it in the work of others. The techinfcal objections to 
the marketplace as a panacea are only one of the many sorts of hurdles to 
be overcome in this area. 
Speculating on the use of real markets, in which concern for delivery 
of environmental benefits or at least in which the reduction of environ- 
mental harm could dominate, requires our going beyond the kinds of 
analyses usually undertaken by economists. In a hypothetical market- 
what we can call an environmentally neutral product marketllG-only a 
small interest in the way in which consumer preferences for competing 
products is shaped. There, we can accept the tautological argument that 
the collective outcome of consumer decisions based on those 
preferences-that is, the mix of competitive products produced by the 
mix of consumer preferences-is the one that we "ought" to have. But 
where we attempt to use preferences for the environment as determinant 
of the level andAdirectioi of environmental regulation-as in an envi- 
ronmentally positive hypothetical market-hdividual and collective 
preferences for environmental quality become critically relevant.lI7 
What this means should be obvious. The regulatory impact of mar- 
< < kets in green" products will necessarily be a function of two 
variables-impact assessment data and consumer preferences.l18 The 
116 There may be very few completely environmentally neutral markets, but leaving aside for the 
moment the potential environmental costs associated with the resources used to manufdcture, 
transport, distribute, use, reuse and then dispose of a tennis racket, that product, to use a 
limited example, is not environmentally harmful. When a consumer chooses a particular 
racket, there is ve little external interest in that purchase. When one ignores the environ- 
ment, the only Sected parries are the manufacturer, competitors, distributors, relevant 
investors, creditors, employees and the consumer. 
117 When environmental concern is superimposed upon the marketplace, the marker assumes 
unprecedented importance to previously uninterested parries. What each consumer does in an 
environmentally sensitive market is of import to other consumers and non-consumers alike. 
The failureofthe market to respond to the dominant concern is premisedupon the inability of 
all the interested parties to exert influence using instruments purely of the market such as 
supply, demand and price. 
118 It is also a product of rice. It is clear that as the prices of environmentally preferred products 
fall, more will bepu$ased. 1f theshifr to these products is from products which more 
environmental harm, then the effectiveness of usin thii kind of a regulatory instrument might 
be enhanced by government policies which mi it reduce the price of the enviromentally 
preferred product. These might include a tax poficy and an environmental labelling entide- 
ment pricing policy. 
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first I have already addressed: regulation of environmental information 
simply demands, within limits, accurate information about the environ- 
mental consequences of market activity. What I have attempted to 
demonstrate so far is that the pursuit of accuracy in this context presents 
a complicated set of problems that are exacerbated by our lack of 
relevant scientific expertise, rendering all but ineffective the traditional 
regulatory instruments currently used to address misleading advertising. 
The second variable, that of preferences, consists of the ways in which 
environmental information is interpreted by consumers. The signifi- 
cance and normative aspects of consumer preference information-for 
example, whether consumers are concerned about global warming or 
about the use ofvirgin, unrecycled materials in product manufacture- 
are, of course, equally crucial to a full appreciation ofwhether or not any 
particular manipulation of the market can effect any particular change. 
Environmental regulators must appreciate that the collective prefer- 
ence for environmental improvement (assuming it can be reflected in 
market choices at all) cannot be taken as given. Our choice of regulatory 
instrument must be predicated on a specific regulatory objective and on 
an educated forecast of the instrument's potential effectiveness in 
achieving that objective. Without knowing the shape of each individual 
consumer's utility functions or the degree to which such functions can 
reflect preferences about environmental quality, we simply cannot accu- 
rately picture the ultimate environmental effect of regulatory 
intervention. 
Of greater concern is the realization that attitudes towards the envi- 
ronment are engendered through acculturation and socialization, which 
are the result of complex interaction between formal eduction, family 
orientation, market advertising, employment experience, community 
participation, as well as a host of other factors, knowable and unknow- 
able, that make us who we are. Relying on markets to generate environ- 
mental benefits means that we are faced, at the most elementary level, 
with the need to understand (and perhaps modify) the attitudes, the 
beliefs, and ultimately the behavioural patterns of consumers and 
producers. 
In Part 11, 1 described the classic response of governments and 
economists, which has been primarily to focus on producers' activities 
and to legislate the computation of environmental degradation into 
production ~ 0 s t s . l ~ ~  By externalizing the production costs associated 
117 In the market the pricesystem is used to convey information to both producers and consumers; 
prices reflect society's preferences forcerrain goods and services. Thereare, however, siruations 
ivhere marker do not convey accurar&nformation. These situations arise when exter- 
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with the disposal of pollutants, in all their forms, industry ends up 
producing more than is economically and socially efficient and, accord- 
ingly, setting lower-than-efficient prices. Economic inefficiency is the 
excess production that causes too much effluent to be dumped into the 
environment. Its source is the incorrect pricing of the product: the 
market price only reflects a firm's marginal private costs of production 
but not the marginal social cost associated with that produ~tion. '~~ 
Thus, the market price does not accurately reflect society's preferences 
for the product because it fails to take into account whatever damage the 
production may inflict on third parties. 
Through the use of direct regulation aimed at forcing producers to 
internalize these  cost^,'^' governments have intervened in the market in 
an attempt to minimize the social costs associated with using the 
environment as a receptacle for the by-products of the production 
process. If direct regulation is effective, the firm is forced to internalize a 
cost that it had previously externalized, thereby increasing their produc- 
tion costs accordingly. One can think of the goal of supply-side regula- 
tion as reconciling the marginal social-cost-of-production curve with 
the firm's supply curve. 
But in order to force the internalization of all of the costs of produc- 
tion to such an extent that the firm's marginal social-cost curve becomes 
its supply curve, the government must have perfect information about 
the negative environmental impact of the firm's activitie~.'~~ Clearly, the 
government does not have perfect information about the environmental 
impact of production processes, nor could it perfectly enforce cost- 
internalization strategies were it to have access to perfect information. 
While direct regulation of firm and industry activities would force some 
internalization of the social costs of production, this internalization 
would necessarily be incomplete. Government failure is surely no less 
fiequent than market failure, and in an imperfect world, government 
regulation will, at best, allow for market prices to reflect imperfectly the 
external costs of production. 
Ifone accepts that simply by focussing on producers it is impossible to 
internalize perfectly the negative externalities associated with producers' 
nalities are present. An externality occurs whenever the activities of one economic agent affect 
the activities of another agent in ways that are not taken into account by the operation of the 
market. W. Nicholson, Externalities and Public Goods" in Microeconomic Theory: B& 
Principles and &ensions, 4th ed. (Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1989) at 718. 
120 RS. Pindyck and D.L. Rubinfeld, "Externalities and Public Goods" in Microeconomics (New 
York: Macmillan, 1989) at 621. 
121 See Part 2, sums 
- .  
lZ2 The government must have perfect knowledge about the mar inal social cost curve associated 
with every firm, it must be able to formulate regulatory pokcies which will force com lete 
internalization of these costs and it must be able to perfectly monitor the activities of the rms 
in order to ensure that there is complete compliance with these regulations. 
R 
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activities, an immediate alternate focus of regulation presents itself. Like 
producers, consumers-as well as other actors in the market-can 
become the focus of regulatory intervention. Traditional regulation of 
consumer behaviour may take the form of consumer information poli- 
cies and consumption taxes. What I am proposing, however, is very 
different-quasi-regulation by government through propaganda and 
education of environmental behaviour. In short, consumer preferences 
can be shaped and behavior patterns altered to follow a more "environ- 
mentally correct" path. 
What current and proposed economic instruments have in common 
is that they take consumer preferences as given, yet even this is problem- 
atic.Iz3 The regulatory instrument that I will briefly explore here is what 
Richard Stewart calls "preference-shaping," that is, convincing con- 
sumers ofwhy and how to change their consumption patterns. As a form 
of regulatory intervention it is much less developed. Such an approach 
to minimizing the external costs associated with production of a certain 
outpur involves influencing demand for that output through modifica- 
tion of consumer attitudes and preferences for the sake of a particular 
environmental good. 
If the demand for consumer products with adverse environmental 
consequences were lower, their prices should fall"* and their supply 
should decrease accordingly. We assume also that as outputs fill, the 
amount of pollution the firm causes likewise decreases. The government 
could use propagandaIZ5 to influence consumer demand so that consum- 
ers "choose" not to demand a product whose production generates 
negative environmental externalities. This choosing results in an inward 
shift of the demand curve; consumers demand less of the good at every 
ment may very well be in a constant state of transformation as they are informed by political 
debate. See RB. Stewarr, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," (1975) 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 1667 at 1704-5 
124 A major difference benveen traditional environmental policies\vhich involve direct regulation 
o f ~ h e  supply side and re atory measures which indirectly influence the demand side is their 
aftecr on price. In bo cases, the equilibrium level of output is lower than before the 
government intervened. When the government intervenes through adjusting private costs to 
reflect social costs, prices increase to reflect the latter social costs associated with roduction. 
When the government intervenes to alter tastes, consumer demand declines an 1 as a result, 
prices fill. It is not, therefore, the market price which changes to reflect the social costs of 
production; rather, a lower consumer demand takes into account those social costs. 
125 Regulatory intervention to correct market failure associated with imperfect information is, of 
course, the least intrusive and most well-developed form of state action. See S. Breyer, 
Reg~htion and its Refom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982) at 161-64 and 
J.P. Kimmel Jr., mpra, note 89 at 530. 
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price. The new demand curve is lower than the old industry demand 
curve, reflecting this change in tastes."' 
The new consumer demand can be thought of as representing a 
demand curve having internalized the external social costs associated 
with the production of a good; the new demand curve then represents 
consumers acting like environmentally sensitive citizens, that is, some 
choosing to consume less ofthe hazardous good, while others none at all. 
The change in consumption patterns in response to the propaganda 
occurs because the government has persuaded some consumers to act 
like environmentally concerned citizens rather than self-interested con- 
sumers. Thus, governments can use propaganda to influence consumers 
to internalize the social costs associated with products the production of 
which generates adverse environmental irnpa~ts.'~' 
What is clear, however, is that regulatory intervention to move the 
demand curves of lawful products is still an under-developed form of 
regulation; that government-funded environmental labelling programs 
have both informational and propaganda chara~teristics,'~' and that 
demand-side regulation through propaganda is likely to be fir more 
effective than supply-side cost internalization. 
The effectiveness of cost internalization strategy in reducing environ- 
mental harm depends on two groups of factors. It depends first on the 
ability of the government to align an industry's marginal social-cost- 
of-production curve with its corresponding supply curve.12g As dis- 
cussed earlier, the extent to which firms will internalize the social costs 
of production in response to regulation depends on the ability of the 
government to ensure compliance with its regulations. Ensuring com- 
pliance with environmental regulations requires a substantial commit- 
'26 The new equilibrium level of output will result in a lower level of pollution generated in the 
production process. As well, the new equilibrium price is lower than it was, reflecting the fact 
- 
;hat at eve6 price consumers are willhg to purihase less ou ut. 
The fact that a government campaign aimed at ganging consumer tastes for a 
certain rood does not result in a com~lete collaose in demand reflects the fact that some 
consumzrs will nor be affected by the g&ernmen2s educational efforts. Some consumers will 
be indifferent to the deleterious effects the production of the good has on the environment. 
Those consumers who choose not to consume the good or to consume less of the good do so 
because they derive utility from not consuming a good whose production is environmentally 
harmful (or they derive disutility from knowingly consuming an environmentally unfriendly 
product). 
' 27  in one sense, this is similar to the government using supply side regulation in an attem t to get 
producers to act like socially responsible members ofsociecy and inrerndize the soci a f  costs of 
. - 
production. 
128 See supra, note 89 at 38, in which reference is made to the Facts that labelling pro rams do not 
simply provide information and that the label represents a conclusion "as to w ich product 
deserves to be chosen on environmental grounds." 
a 
129 Put more simply, the effectiveness of cost internalization de ends on the extent to which 
government regulation forces individual firms to internalize t e environmental costs associ- 
ated with their productive activities. 
E 
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ment of resources to enforcement, including both monitoring industry 
participants and penalizing violators. The problem of information 
asymmetry, also discussed earlier, renders it impossible for the govern- 
ment to monitor perfectly industry participants and, as a result, impos- 
sible for it to ensure complete cost internalization. 
The effectiveness of a cost-internalization strategy also depends on 
the market structure of the industry and on the price elasticity of the 
product's demand. Assuming, for example, that an industry consists of a 
single firm, essentially a monopoly, and that the price elasticity of 
demand for its product is inelastic, it becomes obvious that the effective- 
ness of a cost internalization strategy can be substantially reduced. Since 
the monopolist faces an inelastic demand for its product, any increase in 
price due to an internalization of the social costs of production will have 
very little effect on consumer demand.130 The increased production 
costs are passed directly on to consumers, who end up paying a higher 
unit price without consumming any fewer units. In this case, a cost- 
internalization strategy with the objective of decreasing supply of the 
environmentally unfriendly good is defeated. An inelastic demand for a 
product produced in a competitive market will have a similar effect. 
There, because demand is inelastic, the increase in costs will be passed 
on to the consumer through higher prices, with the industry levels of 
supply and demand remaining approximately the same. 
What begs explanation is the relative paucity of regulatory initiatives 
involving "demand side" regulation. The explanation lies in the myth 
that the state is not, and should not be involving itself in shaping the 
development of consumer tastes. Some believe that it is permissible for 
the state to be implicated in developing intellectual faculties that permit 
individuals to participate in markets and in ensuring the accuracy of 
information about available market choices, but no further. How we 
citizens choose what we choose is somehow not to be the business of the 
state. 
But this proposal generates its own (and perhaps even more difficult) 
set of questions that cannot, like questions about informational accu- 
racy, be addressed through the merely mechanical process of insuring 
access to accurate data. What is the "correct" set of environmental 
preferences the state ought to persuade people to exhibit? What are the 
covert and overt methods it should use to shape those preferences? And 
ultimately, which institutions should the state endow with the respon- 
sibilities of urging such preferences and teaching such methods? 
'30 Of course, if demand for the product is perfectly inelastic, an increase in price will have no 
effect on the level of demand. 
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The first question, of how we are to determine the "correct" set of 
environmental preferences, is perhaps the most difficult. Certainly we 
must acquire sufficient data on the complicated and inter-connected 
environmental impacts of our behaviours to understand the biophysical 
implications of what we are choosing to do. But data alone does not, 
through any purely logical process, generate answers about which 
preferences we ought to have. At its most extreme, what might be an 
environmental good to some people might be an environmental bad to 
others. One could argue, for example, that some residents of areas 
experiencing long-term water shortages might support shifts in markets 
that would sacrifice solid-waste reduction measures in order to conserve 
water supplies. Simultaneously, urban dwellers in regions with abun- 
dant water supplies might very well be willing to trade off water 
conservation in order to preserve remaining land fill sites. We are a long 
way from developing the political processes and methodologies that 
might be used to determine the correct set of environmental preferences, 
those that ought to be reflected in our market and replatory 
activitie~.'~' 
Assuming that we have arrived at a correct set of preferences, the 
second question, of what methods are effective in shaping attitudes to 
these preferences for for the sake of the environmental good, is no more 
easily answered than the first. Environmental acculturation is a con- 
stant, ongoing process involving learning of a kind that is all at once 
direct and indirect, overt and coven, formal and informal, structured 
and random, appropriate and necessary and, occasionally, inappropriate 
and harmful. Such learning can take place at varying levels of conscious- 
ness, sophistication, and moral and material ethos, but, at least for 
purposes of this discussion, the most valuable and socially significant 
learning takes place during our continual interaction with others; com- 
posed of the responses that carry us forward in our environmental 
affiliations and responsibilities. It is what eventually determines our 
understanding of certain environmental expectations-those things 
expected of us and those things we expect of others. Some of this 
learning is formal in the sense that the other participants in our lives 
(parents, teachers, mentors and institutions, such as church and school) 
tell us explicitely what we should be doing in a given situation, what 
response would best fit the predominant environmental ethos. A great 
deal of such learning, however, is acquired in less formal ways- 
131 To say that the process is "a social policy, pditical decision" and to delegate responsibility to 
elected representatives to make the choice In their benevolent wisdom is as naive as to have 
blind and tautological fiith in the market to achieve the "right" outcome. See J.P. Kimmel, 
supra, note 89 at 536. 
Heinonline - -  25 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 270 1991 
I99I  REGULATION OF GREEN ADVERTISING 271 
through our friends and family, and even through strangers. Such 
learning is the sum total of our understanding of the environmental 
norms, values, mores and beliefs that we, as members of our particular 
groups and subgroups, will have internalized over the course of a 
lifetime. 
Our attitudes and responsibilities to the environment (or at least our 
understanding of those responsibilities) are determined in precisely the 
same manner as the determination of anything else we learn, such as the 
norms of our cultures or the skills of reading and writing. Still, this is not 
to suggest that we are taught these things explicitely. The process of 
learning our environmental responsibilities, like the process of acquir- 
ing our cultural norms or reading and writing skills, is a process so 
complex as to be effectively indes~ribable.'~~ 
Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the short-term learning 
of new behaviour will have the desired long-term effect (such as the 
reduction of environmental harm) unless a similar change (the result of 
learning) also takes place in the attitudes, values and belief systems that 
ultimately determine that behaviour. In fact, there is nothing to suggest 
that there could be any real and lasting behavioural change without 
appeal to such overriding ideals. 
And if all of that is true, the third, and ultimate, question remains to 
be answered: If it is environmental beliefs, values and attitudes that must 
be changed or re-learned, who will be supervising the effort to effect that 
learning? To  suggest that government and other such formal manifesta- 
tions of the public will are not involved in shaping attitudes, values and 
belief systems would be entirely specious.133 Nevertheless, we live in a 
'32 Clearly, we learn from others throu h a variety of media and from experience. We mi ht also 
recognize a difference in the types oflearning which we do. Leunin askill, or set ofskiHs such 
readin and writing, is quite different from learning anitu f es, opinions and belie&. 
~everthefes, the question might still he asked, how do we decide what we will learn, i.e. what 
criteria do we use to determine which bits of the tremendous volume of information with 
which we are assaulted, seemingly on a daily basis, to internalize and include? 
Some of the information merely reinforces what we already know and believe, leaving aside 
for the moment the question of how the echte-knowledge came to be, and some is simp1 
ignored, misunderstood or not comprehended. But some of the bits are selected, procesek 
accepted, internalized and become part of our total world view. Although it is clear that some 
of our learning must gain the s t a m  of belief based upon the source which presents it, and 
perhaps the manner in which it is presented, it is equally clear that we occasionall believe 
something because we simply do, with no explicit knowledge of how we came to be ieve it or 
where, in ha, it first impinged upon our consciousness. 
r 
133 Our education systems, for esample, are channels of just that type of learning. It has been 
su ested that the on[ reason that we send our children to school is for acculturation, with 
rea%ng, writin maXematics and sciences merely acting as the vehicles throu h which the 
inculcation of 2 e dominant ideologies can be accomplished. Be that as it may, $ere is clearly 
no reason to doubt that acerrain amount ofsuch learning must go on. In k t ,  for an institution 
like aschool system, a bureaucracy ofsome complexity, to function at all efficiently there must 
be some teaching of, at least, the culture of the institution. I n s o h  as the institutional culture 
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society that espouses the tenets ofliberalism as being fundamental to our 
democratic forms of government, to our respect for individual choice 
and autonomy, and to our willingness to cede to each person the 
responsibility of individual self-determination. 
While environmental preference-shaping through propaganda would 
seem to be a necessary and extremely effective component of market- 
based environmental regulation, engaging in propaganda raises the 
spectre of what Hannah Arendt and others call "the core evil-the 
official determination of the truth or falsity of political opinion,"'34 and 
what is, in Arendt's own words, "possibly the most important instru- 
ment of totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian 
Most of us are willing to accept that children should be overtly and 
explicitely taught in state-run institutions about their roles in society, 
and that to be included in this teaching are those values and beliefs that 
are widely considered as non-controversial, namely, altruism, coopera- 
tion, courtesy and general avoidance of evil lifestyle influences. But once 
we have accomplished such learning and the years of public education 
are behind us, there is something more than a little distastell about 
Omellian thought-police silently invading the sanctity of our homes 
armed with messages about values, ethics and beliefs.13G 
Under certain circumstances, we have been willing to acknowledge 
and accept the government's invading our innermost thoughts."' Dur- 
ing times ofwar and other crises, the seemingly natural pulling together 
of society leaves us vulnerable to government manipulation and propa- 
ganda, even when no effort is made to disguise it as something else.I3' 
Occasionally the subject-matter will determine the acceptance of the 
message.13' Governments, however, are not generally in the business of 
and that of the dominant society overlap, there is a commensurately high degree of learning 
going on which is designed to influence one's ideas about role, expectations, responsibilities, 
rights and obligations. 
1% T.H. Jackson and J.C. Jefiies, "Commercial Freespeech: EconomicDue Process and the First 
Amendment", (1979) 65 Va. L. Rev. I at 39. 
135 H. Arendt, The Or&mofTofaIifarianimt (New York Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, xgyx) at 42. 
- - 
136 This myth, that the state can only legitimate1 control the images and ideas communicated to 
children and others in need of orotection, an&e comolementarv mvrh that the state does not 
and cannot be permitted to regulate the images and idAeas commbni;ated to adults lies behind 
and is capmred by the Supreme Court of Canada's recent decisions surround commercial 
speech, culminating in the strikin down by the Quebec Superior Courr of the federal 
government's legislative ban on to % acco advertising. See A. Hutchinson, "Money Talk 
Against Constitutionalizing (Commercial) Speech", (1990) 17 C.B.L.J. 2. 
137 At least in oven Fashion. That it goes on covertly, all the time according to many commenta- 
tors, is quite another question. 
138 De ending to a large &tent on the general popularity of the cause or the severity of the crisis 
a n l t h e  empathy which can be generated thereby. 
139 The Participaction program, s onsored by the federal government, has enjoyed henomenal R success during its rwenty year !fapan and has gone almost completely unremar ed by those 
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attacking the status quo, not generally in the business of persuading 
people against purchasing legally available products. 
Yet if this is true, if the government is an inappropriate messenger in 
the minds of most, what then is our alternative? Are environmental 
groups, in their enormous diversity, more suitable? Due in part to years 
of dis-empowerment in the hce of serious environmental crises, envi- 
ronmental groups, although serving an important if not vital role, often 
lack the stature and credibility (not to mention the resources) necessary 
to mount continuous programs of public education. Nevertheless , I  'f one 
is convinced that environmental advocacy groups are the most appropri- 
ate messengers, which group or groups should be chosen? Earth First?140 
But if not to governments and ifnot to environmentalists, are we then 
to cede responsibility for environmental acculturalization to private 
industry? Despite the conceptual allure of the somewhat romantic, 
somewhat stylized vision of human learning presented above, it is 
increasingly clear that the most insidious and effective learninglteaching 
dynamic at work on the continent of North America is of the type 
initiated by the various forms of mass media, that is, advertising in 
general and television, radio, newspaper and magazine advertising in 
paticular."' 
for whom a natural inclination to distrust everything said by Ottawawould seem to make it a 
articularly vulnerable target. Clearly a mandate to suggest that good health throu h an active 
'f Efestyle, rather than being sub-em to unFavourable comparisons to sixty year 01 Swedes, is 
considerably less controversial than a scheme designed to revise patterns and habits of 
consumption learned over a lifetime and which would result in a lessening, in many cases, of 
comforr, leisure and convenience. 
1" O t h  First! is a radical environmental group, advocating not only passive civil disobedience, 
but active acts of industrial sabotage. See ' Radical Group suspected in British Columbia", 
Vancorrver Sun (zo September 1991) AI and D. Foreman, Ecodejience: A Fiekf Guide to Monkey 
Wrenching (Tuscon: Ned Ludd Bks., 1987). 
'41 There is no denying that the media, articularly that part of the media made up of advertisers 
devoted to sellin not only products \ ut lifestyles carrying the stamp of approval of corporate 
~ o r t h  ~merica,  kave devoted tremendous amounts of time and effort, not to mention money, 
in learning how to affect the attitudes, belie& and value tems of those exposed to their 
messages. The reason should be clear. Consumers who have T ought the value system, will buy 
the product by which it is represented. Consequently, the underlying message in most ofwhat 
we watch is that consuming is good, not bad. 
B.H. Bagdikian states at 142 in "Dr. Brandreth Has Gone to Harvard" in TheMedia Monopoly 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1983)~ 
At one time or another, advenisers have mcces@Uy demanded that the following ideas 
appear in programs around their ads. 
All businessmen are good or, if not, are always condemned b other businessmen. All 
wan are humane. The status quo is wonderful. Also wondertf; are all grocery stores, 
bakeries, drug companies, restaurants, and laundries. Religionists, especially clergy, are 
perfect. All users of cigarettes are gentle, graceful, healthy, youthful people. In Fact, anyone 
who uses a tobacco product is a hero. People who commit suicide never do it with pills. All 
financial institutions are always in good shape. The American way of life is beyond 
- 
- I 
criticism. 
The above messages, to cite only a few, are not vague inferences. Major advertisers 
insisted, successllly, that these specific ideas be expressed not in the ads but in the 
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The liberal vision of various independent groups struggling on, in 
good faith, in complicated but earnest dialogues with public and private 
sectors in endeavouring to merge and render into reality our societal and 
environmental ideals cannot be reconciled with the conflicting visions 
of the despotic governments, radical environmentalist fictions and 
rapacious entrepreneurs I have alluded to. But can we do nothing at all? 
The intractable questions of the "right" set of consumer preferences for 
the environment, of the ways in which we want to shape those prefer- 
ences, and of the identities of the institutions we think we should 
employ to perform the task of preference-shaping cannot be answered 
here. Most disturbing is that far too few of us are trying to think about 
these questions at all. 
VII. EPILOGUE 
Returning briefly to our example of the unjust society and reference 
about a world that is peopled not with cynics or masochists but with 
people as they generally are, the point to be emphasized is that we must 
believe that either "the injustices are en route to being amended, or that 
they are counterbalanced by greater benefits, or that they are inevitable, 
or that they are not really injustices at all."'42 In substituting the words 
"environmental damage" for injustices we immediately realize that this 
is very much the way Western societies have tended to view the problem 
of ecb~o~ical destruction. Given our naive belief in the imrno;tality of 
the species and the rightness of our continued technological progress, is 
it any wonder that we continue to do the very things that will cause the 
most damage to our environment and do the most harm to ourselves? 
Consider our many outlooks and the ways we rationalize them. Envi- 
ronmental damage will eventually be fixed, someday, by somebody. 
Environmental damage and its costs are outweighed by the benefits of a 
greater economic good. Environmental damage is inevitable simply 
because there are too many people for too few resources. Environmental 
harm is merely a myth caused by environmentalist fringe groups' 
overreacting, crying wolf. Reasoning along any of these lines unfor- 
tunately not only fails to inspire people to take responsibility, it hrther 
serves to reinforce and perpetuate that failure. We then end up either 
leaving it to others-generally those possessed of greater expertise, skill 
and learning-to fix things for us, or consoling ourselves with hopelll 
ostensibly 'independent' news reporting, editorial content, or entertainment programs of 
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. 
- - - 
142 T. Eagleton, mpra, note 115 at 27. 
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calculations of economic benefit over environmental detriment. Or 
fatalistically separating ourselves from the possibility of any workable 
solution. Or worse, blinding ourselves to our very desperate need for 
one. 
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